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7 On the Limits of Rational Moral Education
James S. Leming
Contemporary approaches to moral education feature individual choice
through rational decision making as the essential component of morality .
There is no research which indicates that these approaches significantly al-
ter moral behavior. This paper explores the reasons for moral education's
ineffectiveness and offers an alternative perspective on the proper purpose
and methods for moral education . A review of the literature on the develop-
ment of prosocial behavior found that social interactions during childhood
are highly significant in the development of a morality . From this research
perspective rationality is not a major determinant of moral behavior . The
functionalist perspective of Emile Durkheim on the development of personal
morality was also discussed . This paper builds upon the above two perspec-
tives to develop a broad conception of directive moral education which em-
phasizes modeling, induction, and the necessity of organizing the moral ed-
ucation curriculum around a gradient of rationality.
35 Are the Critics Right about MACOS?
Buckley Barnes, William Stallings, and Roberta Rivner
Man: A Course of Study (MACOS) has been perhaps the most controver-
sial curriculum in America's schools. Critics have charged that MACOS
contributes to an acceptance of practices repugnant to a large segment of
the population . These practices include : murder, senilicide, female infanti-
cide, divorce, cannibalism, and cruelty to animals . The present study inves-
tigated the effects of MACOS on the attitudes of 49 fourth-grade students
toward these practices and compared them with the attitudes of 46 non-
MACOS students. A pre and posttest attitudinal inventory (with six sub-
scales) was administered to both groups . Hotelling's T was used to com-
pare pretest-posttest differences between the two groups . It was concluded
that MACOS did not contribute to an acceptance of the six practices
investigated.
i
45 Elementary School Teachers' Planning for Social Studies and
Other Subjects
Gail McCutcheon
While we have evidence that people think and plan in different ways, the
model of planning which dominates the educational literature is that of
objectives-first activity. This study is a report of a 1978 research project of
four researchers and twelve teachers, a project which studies how those
twelve teachers planned lessons in their elementary school classrooms . The
report discusses planning processes and influences of planning on the cur-
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riculum, with a focus on social studies, influences on teachers' plans, and
the implications of the study .
67 Toward a Reconstruction of Social Education
William B. Stanley
This is the second of two articles dealing with the reconstructionist rational
for social education . The first article provided an analysis of reconstruction-
ism as expressed in the works of George Counts and Theodore Brameld
(Stanley, 1981) . These two authors developed a rationale for social educa-
tion which differed significantly from those of their contemporaries who
were often labeled as reconstructionists . The Counts-Brameld rational will
hereafter be referred to as radical reconstructionism . The first article ex-
plained the basic tenets of radical reconstructionism and outlined the radi-
cal reconstructionist rationale for social education . This article has two ba-
sic objectives . First, it examines the extent to which the tenets of radical
reconstructionism are reflected in five dominant rationales for modern so-
cial education . Second, the basic tenets of radical reconstruction are used as
criteria to analyze the adequacy of the five modern rationales .
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On the Limits of Rational Moral
Education
James S. Leming
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
It is still very much an open question whether or not the interest in
moral education over the past decade and one-half has in any significant
way increased schools' ability to influence students' moral behavior . Recent
reviews of research by Lockwood (1978) and Leming (in press) on the two
most visible and widely practiced approaches in the field, values clarifica-
tion and cognitive development, suggest that student growth, which occurs
as a result of these programs, is unrelated to social behavior . There exists
no evidence that values clarification has any significant impact on interper-
sonal behavior . The consistent finding from the cognitive-developmental re-
search indicates that, as a result of discussion of moral dilemmas over the
course of a year, one can expect to find a modest gain in subjects' stage of
moral reasoning : between 1/4 and 3/4 of a stage among 50 to 70 percent of
the students. It has not been found that shifts in the levels of reasoning
found in public school students are associated with changes in social behav-
ior. I have the nagging suspicion that, should Hartshorne and May reap-
pear today to conduct another Character Education Study, this time focus-
ing on the impact of contemporary moral education curricula, the results
would be just as discouraging as those found in the late 1920's .
Since the preponderance of current research on moral education is lim-
ited to verbal and written behavior, it is possible to hold out hope that, if
only the correct variables could be identified and measured, positive results
could be found regarding students' morally relevant social behavior . I am
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skeptical regarding this likelihood . As I have read the available literature
on moralization, namely with regard to the development of and relationship
between thought and moral action, it has become increasingly obvious that
in spite of the creative and significant efforts of Lawrence Kohlberg to
bridge the gap between psychological knowledge and educational practice,
there still remains a deep chasm between what is known regarding morali-
zation and the assumptions underlying current conceptions of moral educa-
tion. Current educational practice in moral education pays little heed to
currently available knowledge from the behavioral sciences regarding the
influences and dynamics within the moralization process .
In this paper I will attempt to clarify some of the reasons for the failure
of contemporary moral education to yield socially significant results . First,
I will examine the practices of contemporary moral education from the per-
spective of the development of prosocial behavior . It will be argued that dif-
ferences between what the behavioral sciences reveal about the development
of prosocial behavior and the assumptions implicit in contemporary moral
education are a significant factor in the failure of current moral education
efforts . Secondly, I will examine the assumptions of contemporary moral
education from the perspective of Emile Durkheim (1973) . In both com-
parisons I will attempt to show that the assumptions of contemporary moral
education represent an unnecessarily narrow conception of morality. In do-
ing so, it will be argued that contemporary moral education programs ig-
nore principles regarding the learning or moral behavior which can be de-
rived from an analysis of the crucial areas where adult morality is forged .
Finally, I will attempt to sketch out what I see as a more viable approach
to moral education which accords a significant role to the social basis of
morality.
The Development of Prosocial Behavior and Contemporary Moral Education
One of the major foci of moralization research is the development of
prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior has been defined by Muessen and Ei-
senberg-Berg (1979) as " . . . actions that are intended to aid or benefit
another person or group of people without the actors' anticipation of exter-
nal rewards" (p . 3) . Prosocial behavior represents only one of many possi-
ble character traits (virtues) which are an appropriate goal for moral edu-
cation . The discussion below assumes that other character traits, e.g .,
honesty, would be learned according to similar psychological dynamics. An
examination of the psychological dynamics involved in the learning of
prosocial behavior will provide a perspective for analyzing and evaluating
the instructional strategies of contemporary moral education.
The Determinants of Prosocial Behavior . What are the major determi-
nants of prosocial behavior? What factors account for individual and group
variation in prosocial behavior? Three clusters of variables, which are rele-
vant with regard to understanding the limits and potentialities of moral ed-
ucation, have been shown to be significant antecedents of prosocial behavior .'
'The discussion which follows below draws heavily upon, but is not limited to, the recent sum-
maries of research of the development of prosocial behavior by Muessen and Eisenberg-Berg
(1977), Rushton (1980), Staub (1978), and Bar-Tal (1976) .
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Cultural influences . In many cultures prosocial behavior is common,
whereas in other cultures egoistic, selfish behavior is the norm . The behav-
ior of Ik children, as frighteningly described by Turmbull (1972), con-
trasted with the altruistic and group concern of the young children in the
USSR (Bronfrenbrenner, 1970), illustrates well the wide variations found
in different cultures. Whiting and Whiting (1975), in one of the few stud-
ies to identify factors related to the occurrence of prosocial behavior across
cultures, found that children are likely to engage in a high degree of
prosocial behavior if: (1) the culture has a simple social and economic or-
ganization with the presence of the extended family ; (2) children are, at an
early age, assigned tasks and responsibilities which contribute to family
welfare ; (3) women perform important economic functions; (4) considera-
tion of others, group orientation, and sharing are stressed and rewarded by
the major socialization agents .
Socialization influences . Cultural influences do not produce a population
uniform in its propensity to engage in prosocial behavior . Significant
within-group variance remains to be explained . Socialization practices
within cultures display significant variation and enhance or restrict the de-
velopment of prosocial behavior . Family members, especially parents, have
been found to be the most significant agents of socialization . Although few
in-depth ethnographic studies exist which tie observations in the naturalistic
setting of the early home environment to later social behavior, a variety of
questionnaires and experimental reproductions of socialization experiences
and practices have suggested that modeling, nurturance, disciplinary tech-
niques, maturity demands and assignments of responsibility are significant
factors in the development of prosocial behavior .
A variety of studies has repeatedly shown that modeling is a powerful
factor in producing both short and lasting changes in social behavior . These
studies have typically involved contrived experimental situations (Rushton,
1975 ; Staub, 1971 ; White, 1972 ; Rice, 1975) or naturally occurring child
rearing practices (Hoffman, 1963 ; Hoffman, 1975 ; Hoffman and Salzstein,
1967) . The observation of a model performing prosocial acts is likely to
raise the child's level of such behaviors as generosity, helping, and sharing,
often for periods of long duration . Bronfrenbrenner (1970) has identified
seven characteristics of the model as being related to its potential
effectiveness :
1 . The potency of the model increases with the extent to which the
model is perceived as possessing a high degree of competence, status
and control over resources .
2. The inductive power of the model increases with the degree of prior
nurturance or regard exhibited by the model .
3. The most "contagious" models for the child are likely to be those
who are the major sources of support and control in the environ-
ment; namely, parents, playmates, and older children and adults
who play a prominent role in his/her everyday life .
9
4 . The inductive power of the model increases with the degree to
which the person perceives the model as similar to him/herself.
5 . Several models, exhibiting similar behavior, are more powerful in-
ducers of change than a single model .
6. The potency of the model is enhanced when the behavior exhibited
is a salient feature of the actions of a group of which the child al-
ready is or aspires to be a member .
7. The power of the model to induce actual performance (as distin-
guished from acquisition) is strongly influenced by the observed
consequences for the model of the exhibited behavior .
Nurturance, essentially a form of modeling where parents display char-
acteristics such as consideration, kindness, and sympathy, has not been
shown, by itself, to account for the development of prosocial behavior . The
evidence on the relationship between nurturance and prosocial behavior is
equivocal (Hoffman, 1975 ; Rutherford and Mussen, 1968 ; Yarrow and
Scott, 1972) . Perhaps the most reasonable conclusion is that nurturance
may be a significant factor in strengthening the predisposition to engage in
prosocial behavior when it is a part of child rearing practices which involve
the modeling of prosocial acts .
The way parents discipline influences their children's social behavior .
Two types of disciplinary techniques have been shown to be significant in
this respect: (1) power assertion-control by physical power or material re-
sources, e.g ., physical punishment or withdrawal of materials or privileges ;
and (2) induction-reasoning with the child, especially explaining the pain-
ful consequences of the child's act for him/herself and for others. Research
has indicated that power assertion tends to diminish the child's propensity
to engage in prosocial behavior while use of induction techniques facilitates
the development of prosocial orientations (Hoffman, 1963 ; Hoffman and
Salzstein, 1967) .
Maturity demands, parental maintenance of high standards, together
with control and pressures on children to behave in mature ways, especially
with respect to assuming responsibility for others, have a positive effect on
prosocial behavior (Baumrind, 1971 ; Whiting and Whiting, 1975) . Bron-
frenbrenner's (1970) examination of child rearing and schooling in the
USSR illustrates well the power of this mode of socialization .
It is obvious that parents and the early social environment of the child
have a substantial impact on the development of children . Two additional
sources of socialization experiences of prosocial tendencies outside of the
early home environment have been identified. Peers have been shown to be
a highly significant source of modeling behaviors of both antisocial and
prosocial behaviors (Bandura, 1969 ; Bryan and Walbeck, 1970; Hartup
and Coates, 1967) . There is also indisputable evidence that the mass me-
dia, especially television, is a significant factor in socialization . It has been
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shown that tendencies toward aggressive and violent behavior (Liebert,
Neale and Davidson, 1973 ; Eron, et al ., 1972), as well as tendencies
toward prosocial behaviors such as gentleness, helping, and sharing
(Coates, Pusser and Goodman, 1976 ; Friedrich and Stein, 1973), can be
increased through television role models . Strangely enough, given the
amount of time children spend in formal school settings, there is little evi-
dence concerning the nature and extent of the impact of teachers' modeling
behavior on children .
Cognitive and Affective Influences. Although one might assume that judg-
ments and reasoning about moral issues would impact significantly on ten-
dencies to engage in prosocial behavior, the evidence is less than compelling
in this regard. There is some evidence to suggest that level of moral judg-
ment may be a regulator of an individual's propensity to engage in
prosocial behavior; however, -the evidence is neither strong nor consistent
(see summary of research in Mussen and Eisenberg-Berg, 1977, pp . 124-
126) . The correlations discovered between level of moral judgment and
prosocial behavior have demostrated that a relationship does exist ; however,
the correlations have not had sufficient strength to permit accurate predic-
tion of any particular individual's behavior .
Research on cognitive role taking, the ability to take the perspective of
and accurately describe the feelings of others, has been found to be a signif-
icant antecedent of prosocial behavior (Flavell, 1968 ; Krebs and Sturrup,
1974) . It appears that the ability to perceive others' interests and feelings
accurately is a prerequisite to taking action to aid others. One cannot de-
cide to help others unless one can determine whether or not they are in
need of help.
Empathy, emotional responses shared by the individual based on per-
ceptions of others' feelings, has also been shown to a potent antecedent of
prosocial behavior (Krebs, 1975) . Studies have demonstrated that training
in role taking and empathy can contribute significantly to lessening antiso-
cial behavior and increasing prosocial behavior (Staub, 1971 ; Chandler,
1973) .
Cultural and social factors appear to be the most directly linked with
the learning of prosocial behavior . To the extent that the young child exper-
iences models of, expectations for, and reinforcement of prosocial behavior,
such behavior is likely to be learned . Early on, the immediate family pro-
vides the nutriment for the learning of prosocial behavior . As the social
world of the child expands, other factors, especially interactions with peers
and the expansion of potential models through the media, become increas-
ingly important. To the extent that these later influences are perceived as of
high salience and also at variance with earlier learning, alterations in origi-
nal dispositions may take place . Additionally, a variety of cognitive and af-
fective factors such as level - of moral reasoning, role taking, and empathy
have been shown to be related to the disposition to engage in prosocial be-
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havior and to account for some of the interpersonal variations found in
prosocial behavior. However, it has not been shown that these cognitive and
affective factors can, independent of social and cultural influences, account
for the incidence of prosocial behavior . These factors likely mediate existing
dispositions .
Available evidence fails to implicate schools in any significant way in
learning of prosocial behavior . In fairness, it must be noted that social
scientists have failed to expend any significant effort to identify possible in-
school determinants of prosocial behavior . This lack of evidence does not
mean that one can conclude that schools play no role in the learning of
prosocial behavior . To the extent that schools constitute a significant di-
mension of the child's social and cultural environment, they likely do play a
role. However, it is still an open question as to the extent to which selected
in-school variables such as teacher modeling behavior, classroom or school
climate, or the cognitive outcomes of specific moral education curricula are
differentially associated with variations in prosocial behavior . Bronfren-
brenner's (1970) analysis of schooling in the USSR suggests that schooling
has the potential to be, in consort with family and society, a significant in-
fluence in the moral learning of children . However, the dynamics Bronfren-
brenner identifies as potentially significant in the moral development of
youth stand in stark contrast to the assumptions and environment in which
moral education is practiced in our society .
The Limits of Contemporary Moral Education From the Perspective of the
Development of Prosocial Behavior . A comparison of the practices of con-
temporary moral education with the processes involved in the learning of
prosocial behavior may provide a key to understanding some of the reasons
for the failure of explicit moral education to have a clearly discernable im-
pact on moral behavior . The first task is therefore to identify the major as-
sumptions shared by current approaches to moral education concerning the
nature of learning of moral behavior .
The field of moral education contains a wide variety of approaches . The
analysis in this section will be based on the three approaches which enjoy
the widest notoriety and acceptance: the values clarification approach
(Raths, Harmin, and Simon, 1978) ; the cognitive developmental approach
of Kohlberg (Hersh, Paolitto, and Reimer, 1979) ; and the rational analysis
approach (e.g ., Newmann, 1970; Fraenkel, 1977 ; Nelson, 1974; and Met-
calf, 1971) .
Although each of the above approaches to moral education has a dis-
tinctive emphasis, they share a number of common perspectives concerning
the goals of moral education, the nature of the learner, and the proper
function of teachers and schools :
1) The purpose of moral education is seen as the development of the
decision making skills and orientations . Growth is to be fostered and out-
comes to be evaluated within decision making contexts . The content of the
12
decision making is problematic situations . These situations may be either
social in nature (welfare laws, ERA, abortion policies, etc .) or personal
(lying to protect a friend, keeping a promise, etc.) .
2) Moral education programs assume that reason plays a major role in
motivating action . That is, once individuals decide what their moral obliga-
tions are, they act in accordance with those rationally determined obliga-
tions. Hence, the goal of moral education becomes to influence thought ; it
is assumed that action will necessarily follow .
3) Current moral education approaches . assume that morally educated
individuals are independent and autonomous, subordinate only to the dic-
tates of their reason and certain higher order decision making principles .
4) Contemporary moral education eschews advocating any specific
moral content. The outcome of contemporary programs is left open with re-
gard to specific moral injunctions . All of the approaches caution against
moralizing. Within each of the approaches, however, there is agreement
that certain forms of deliberation are preferable over others . That is, each
of the approaches emphasizes certain ingredients of appropriate moral rea-
soning such as attention to facts, exploration of alternatives, following rules
of evidence and reducing or eliminating inconsistency . Non-rational meth-
ods of warranting statements of moral obligation are generally ignored or
discouraged . For example, divine revelation, astrology, the I-Ching' and the
like are not included as a part of moral education curriculum .
5) The teacher's role is primarily that of a facilitator of the deliberative
process . Within the context of the moral education lessons, teachers are
urged to exercise extreme caution before advocating any specific moral con-
tent. The teacher also has the responsibility to develop in the classroom an
environment that is conducive to the free, open and nonjudgmental ex-
change of ideas .
6) Moral education occurs as discrete lessons, planned by the teacher,
occurring within the parameters of the existing curricula . It takes place
usually on a weekly or monthly basis within existing courses in the form of
single classroom exercises .
7) Students are not to be evaluated with either praise, disapproval, or
grades concerning the correctness of their moral decisions . Teachers evalu-
ate students, if at all, only on the degree to which they have followed the
prescribed decision making procedures .
The following differences exist between the dynamics of moralization in
the development of prosocial behavior and the assumptions held by contem-
porary moral education programs . In the moralization process examples are
presented and specific social behaviors are learned in naturally occurring
social contexts . Reinforcement is generally immediate and derives from in-
dividuals perceived as significant . In moral education social behavior is gen-
erally not rewarded or punished by the classroom teacher as a regular part
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of the moral education curriculum . Also, the salience of teachers is gener-
ally much lower than other figures in the child's environment . Of course,
teachers punish and praise for a variety of behaviors in schools, but the
above approaches do not recommend teacher behavior of this sort as an in-
tegral part of their program . The literature on moralization suggests that
the learning of moral behavior is embedded within the child's social envi-
ronment and that the behaviors learned by the child are tied directly to his/
her social life . Moral education, on the other hand, focuses on hypothetical
and/or problematic situations posed to the child, and the teacher is not en-
couraged, as part of the moral education program, to attempt to foster
specific social behaviors .
In the moralization process thought oftentimes follows action . That is,
the reason is used to explain an action after that action is already an ac-
complished fact. Reasoning frequently arises out of behavior to explain, in-
terpret, or rationalize experience . It has also been found that giving reasons
for a certain act or policy is an effective means of influencing behavior . In-
duction, explaining the painful consequences of an act for oneself or others,
has been found to be a powerful factor in the moralization process (Hoff-
man and Salzstein, 1967 ; Hoffman, 1963 ; Dlugokinski and Firestone,
1974) . Changes in behavior can result in changes in thought ; thought can
give rise to new behavior . To the extent that moral education focuses solely
on the latter, it ignores a powerful means of moral education .
It would appear that contemporary moral education and the develop-
ment of prosocial behavior are operating in different domains and under
different assumptions. The lack of evidence supporting current moral edu-
cation efforts to have a significant impact on moral behavior can be attrib-
uted in part to the failure to develop and build upon a theoretical and
methodological foundation consistent with available knowledge concerning
the moralization process . It may be that one ought not to expect too much
regarding changes in social behavior as a result of shifts in rational func-
tioning . However, even if too much is commonly expected from efforts to
improve moral thinking, it remains highly questionable whether moral edu-
cation should continue to focus its efforts on thinking alone .
A major reason for moral education's inattention to the moralization
process is to be found in the ethos underlying our current political system .
Respect for the freedom of individual citizens and our concern for human
justice and dignity within a democratic context are commonly interpreted
as meaning that rational inquiry and individual choice are the only legiti-
mate means of social, political and moral education . Decision making has
become the sole focus of moral education . In an attempt to develop a con-
ception of moral education consistent with the democratic ethos and em-
phasizing free choice and rational decision making, positions have been de-
veloped which place severe limits on the potential effectiveness of
contemporary moral education .
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The literature on the development of prosocial behavior suggests that
the social environment in which the child develops contains the key for un-
derstanding both the process and content of moralization. One of the major
contributions to the understanding of the social basis of morality rests in
the work of Emile Durkheim . Durkheim's view of the functional role of mo-
rality and moral education in society offers a perspective which takes into
account the social basis of the learning of morality while at the same time
allows for the development of autonomous moral thought . Contemporary
moral education has failed to address adequately the apparent conflict be-
tween democratic societies' need for a populace which is at the same time
loyal to the basic social norms of that society and also able to exercise inde-
pendent judgment concerning responsibilities and obligations . In the re-
mainder of this paper I will present Durkheim's view of the function and
dynamics of moral education, discuss the implications of this view for con- ,
temporary moral education, and, finally, deal with some inevitable ques-
tions and objections likely to arise concerning such a position .
Contemporary Moral Education from the
Structural-Functional' Perspective
Durkheim (1975) holds that morality is essentially a social undertak-
ing. Society is the source of morality and its purpose is the collective inter-
est of society . In order to maintain a social environment, which protects the
rights and welfare of its members, any society needs a comprehensive sys-
tem of prohibitions whose objective is to limit the range within which indi-
vidual behavior occurs . Morality, therefore, consists of a socially accepted
system of rules that predetermines conduct. These rules state how one must
act in given situations . To behave properly is to follow these rules conscien-
tiously. These rules are ultimately justified by their efficacy in maintaining
a stable environment in which the individual can live with dignity and
freedom .
According to Durkheim, there are three essential elements involved in
the concept of morality . The first of these elements is discipline . Discipline
is the disposition that regularizes conduct within the totality of rtioral rules
that operate within society . It is the willful assent to conform to this order .
Essential to the concept of discipline is both man's propensity for regularity
and, therefore, the need to yield to the moral order, and the need to restrict
impulse or inclination. That is, conduct must become orderly, follow social
mores, and transcend impulse and suggestion . Society requires that impulse
be controlled . In order for civic life to succeed, the individual must be free
from the incessant search for appropriate conduct . Discipline is the control-
'The structural-functional theory in sociology holds that social structure and dynamics are
adaptive to the fulfill functions for personal needs and social requirements . That is, existing
forms of society serve an essential role in the maintenance of that society's equilibrium and
continuing survival . To understand any dimension of society, like morality and moral educa-
tion, one looks for functional values of that institution for the society . Emile Durkheim was
one of the seminal writers associated with this perspective .
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ling of that impulse, the recognition of the authority of the moral law, and
the willful subjugation of the individual to that law .
The second element of morality is attachment to the group . Discipline
and the collective ideal are two reflections of the same reality . Since moral
authority is social in origin, attachment to the group is society conceived as
that which is desirable and good, that which attracts us . Discipline, on the
other hand, is society conceived as that which commands us .
The third element of morality is autonomy or self-determination . One of
the fundamental axioms of morality is that the human being is the "sacred
thing par excellence." As a result, it follows that any restriction on individ-
ual conscience is immoral since it violates individual autonomy . Durkheim
avoids the apparent contradiction between individual autonomy and the
necessary subjugation of the individual to the collective interest by holding
that the conformity embodied in morality in its mature form is not the re-
sult of physical restraint or external imposition . Instead it is the result of
individual reflection which deems conformity as good because it is judged
that there exists no other alternative for social life . This recognition is not
one of resignation, but rather is based upon enlightened allegiance. Libera-
tion occurs through the willful assent to society and morality, recognizing
that there is no other basis for either personal or social life . The individual,
through his/her reason, is able to check the extent to which the moral order
is based upon the natural order of things and, to the extent that it is found
as such, freely conform .
The Theory and Practice of Moral Education . The goal of moral education
is to develop in the child the elements of morality : dicipline, attachment to
group and autonomy-the self-chosen sense of the good and one's duty . Al-
though Durkheim describes autonomy as essential to the concept of moral-
ity, he cautions against viewing morality as a personal artifact whose con-
figurations, from childhood, are totally created by the individual . Durkheim
recognizes that the rational as well as the non-rational play significant roles
in the moralization of the child . Durkheim suggests that among the very
young the teacher's role necessarily involves the use of some non-rational
activities, for example, the use of his/her authority to convey rules in a
powerful manner and the use of punishment to signal vigorous disapproval
of the violation of moral rules . Later in the child's development, when con-
ceptual and reasoning powers are more fully developed, the role of reason-
ing becomes more of the teacher's province . The process of moral education
strives to shift gradually the initial deference to moral authority instilled in
the early years toward an internal self-chosen moral orientation . Durkheim
does not make the mistake of assuming that what constitutes fullblown
adult morality should define the practice of moral education with the very
young. Two attributes of young children, their suggestability and prefer-
ence for regularity, should be used by the teacher to achieve the early goals
of education. Early on, according to Durkheim, the teacher must state or-
ders regarding moral rules and social order, with firmness and resolution . It
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is through the teacher that the morality of the classroom (in effect, a social
group with an existing moral code) is revealed to the child . Since moral vi-
olation, the breaking of the moral code, undermines and diminishes the so-
cial morality, the teacher, in order to preserve the worth of the rule, must
clearly and forcefully censure that act . Vigorous disapproval is therefore
the essence of punishment .
From the Durkheimian perspective the role of the teacher is to structure
the class in such a way as to insure that moral sentiments develop and that
they are reinforced through a sense of unity which grows out of common
enterprise. All children have altruistic sentiments. Giving the child an idea
of the groups that he/she belongs to, and attaching him/her to these groups
through collective life and- efforts, helps to insure that the altruistic will tri-
umph over the egoistic and the impulsive. The love of the collective life is to
be developed in the young children through : (a) gradually broadening the
consciousness of the child to infuse it with the ideals of the social groups to
which he/she belongs, (b) linking these ideas with the greatest number of
similar ideas and feelings, (c) communicating these group ideals and feel-
ings with warmth and feeling, and (d) developing the power of moral ac-
tion through exercise-group effort in the collective interest.
The classroom plays an important role in the moral education process
because it represents an intermediary step between the affective morality of
the family and the more-impartial morality of the society ; in it the child be-
gins to lose some of his/her uniqueness by being treated more impartially
than in the family. This initial subjugation of the child to an impartial
moral code is critical if the child is to develop and finally, upon reaching
adulthood, function as a morally responsible manner . The school can con-
tribute to the moral development of children in a manner that the family
cannot. Within the family the bonds and sense of solidarity are developed
from blood relationship and are reinforced by constant contact and interac-
tion. Political society, ideally constituted, is not predicated upon personal
relationships . The proper function of the school is to bridge the gap be-
tween the moral system of the home, based on love and intimacy, and the
moral system of the society, impersonal and based on collective self-inter-
est. School is more than the transmission of knowledge and modes of think-
ing. If society remains only an apprearance, a far off ideal to the child, then
he/she is likely to call into question the devotion and sacrifice which is at
the root of moral life-because the referent is unclear. Society must be
fleshed out to the child . The knowledge of the social sciences and the hu-
manities provides insights which allow the child to move to a mature moral-
ity. Morality that is originally based upon a degree of fear and deference to
powerful authority gradually broadens to include attachment to groups and
finally, through reason and study, develops into autonomous self-
acquiescence .
The Limitations of Contemporary Moral Education From the Structural-
Functional Perspective . From the structural-functional perspective the
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weaknesses of contemporary moral education are largely errors of omission
that center around 1) the emphasis on fostering decision making processes
rather than moral content, 2) the ignoring of the role of non-rational pro-
cesses in moral learning, and 3) the inattention to the significant potential
of the moral environment of the school in the moral education process .
Within the Durkheimian perspective rationality plays a significant role, for
it is only through a reasoned examination of the contemporary moral life
that one reaches the morally mature position of enlightened assent and con-
formity to those standards . Durkheim realizes that there is always the pos-
sibility that the precise nature of one's obligations may be ambiguous or
that the situation may be novel . However, where contemporary moral edu-
cation characterizes the individual's moral life as involving continual crisis
and novelty, Durkheim conceives of moral life as governed primarily by
routine and habit. As a result of the emphasis on the novel and problem-
atic, contemporary moral education avoids attempting to teach children
concrete ways of behaving in specific situations . Instead, contemporary
moral education places the emphasis on open-ended questions concerning
one's obligations in each specific situation . The principles which contempo-
rary moral education suggests we teach are what John Wilson (1967) has
called second order principles, that is, skills necessary to make good reason-
able moral decisions . What has been omitted by contemporary moral edu-
cation is the teaching of specific first order principles-principles contain-
ing the content of moral beliefs (e.g ., always tell the truth, never take what
doesn't belong to you, etc . ) . Although there is recognition within contempo-
rary moral education that certain general first order principles (e.g ., jus-
tice, freedom, human dignity) provide the ultimate basis for our delibera-
tions, these principles are stated so generally that they do not suggest
specific actions for specific situations . Instruction involving only moral prin-
ciples at this level of generality does not provide an adequate basis for the
moral training of youth . In order to develop moral habits and dispositions,
specific duties in specific social contexts are required .
The literature on the development of prosocial behavior supports Durk-
heim's view that the child is not initially led to moral behavior through
training in decision making processes . This initial learning of one's duties,
and the moral rules of society, necessarily occurs through non-rational
means. Peters (1963) notes that :
. . . . given that it is desirable to develop people who conduct them-
selves rationally, intelligently and with a fair degree of spontaneity, the
brute facts of child development reveal that at the most formative
years of a child's development he is incapable of this form of life and
impervious to the proper manner of passing it on . (p. 54)
The challenge for moral education is to find means of instruction which ini-
tiate children into life in society governed by moral rules while at the same
time do not close the door on the development of independent rational
moral judgment at a later point in the child's development . This task is one
18
about which there is little information in the psychological literature to
guide educational practice and one in which current proponents of moral
education take little interest . Contemporary moral education takes a jaun-
diced view of any attempts to instill specific morals in children . Teachers
who present specific moral ideals to children are generally accused of "in-
doctrination," a sin of the utmost severity to most moral educators . Cries
concerning the respect for the individual, the pluralistic nature of our soci-
ety, etc ., usually rain down on those who suggest that we ought to teach,
explicitly or implicitly, specific first order moral principles . The teaching of
specific values has been disparagingly labeled the "bag of virtues" approach
by the cognitive developmentalists . Values learned in an unreflective man-
ner have been seen as a major source of psychological malaise by the propo-
nents of values clarification . Through dismissing the non-rational in morali-
zation so easily, contemporary moral education has overlooked a necessary
and essential dimension in the moralization of youth .
To the extent that schooling is currently a significant factor in the
learning of morality in children, it is the result of the social and moral cli-
mate of the schools, the peer interactions that take place there, and the
non-curricular communications between teachers and students concerning
school and community standards of right and wrong. With the exception of
occasional jeremiads against the hidden curriculum's potential for making
children passive and unreflective, moral education has, until recently, failed
to take a hard look at the potential of the hidden curriculum for moral edu-
cation. This reluctance is understandable in that the dynamics of the hid-
den curriculum in the learning of moral behavior are essentially non-reflec-
tive and indoctrinaire, which strike at the very heart of the tenets of current
curriculum efforts.
If Durkheim is correct in his view of the proper method and content of
moral education, then contemporary moral education presents an incom-
plete view on the moral education process . It attempts to deal only with the
end of the process (rational autonomy) and rejects its foundation . To the
extent that the rational approach advocated by contemporary moral educa-
tion assists children and young adults in rationally recognizing the legiti-
macy of contemporary life and providing a means for deciding one's moral
obligations in real life contexts, it has the potential to be a significant factor
within the moral education process . However, to the extent that it develops
in the child the expectation that he/she exists independent of society with
no restraints on his/her behavior other than what his/her reason dictates, it
is dangerous to the child and to the society within which the child will live
his/her adult life. Morality, and hence moral education, is built on a foun-
dation based on the rules of collective life within a given society . There is
no alternative to social life, and, to the extent that any approach to moral
education fails to recognize the necessity of instilling adherence to the just
moral rules in that society, it fails both the child and the society . The hid-
den message that is conveyed to youth by contemporary moral education
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curricula efforts is that all moral questions are open, there are no set rules,
and it's up to each individual to decide each case for him/herself .
New Directions for the Practice of Moral Education
In this section I will present a reformulation of the goals and practices
of moral education . This reformulation will not be a utopian vision . Instead
it will be based on the assumption that the basic configuration of life in
schools for teachers and students will remain much as it has in the past ;
that is, the subjects taught will remain constant, school boards and admin-
istrative staff will remain relatively conservative, and teachers will continue
to face classes of approximately 30 students for 185 days a year. In this re-
formulation I am ruling out such utopian visions as democratic schools and
required or elective courses in moral education . These are ruled out not be-
cause they might not be valuable, but rather because past history and cur-
rent economic and social forces indicate that they are unlikely to occur to
any great extent . In making my suggestions, I will be drawing upon the em-
pirical findings regarding the development of prosocial behavior and the
Durkheimian analysis of the proper forms of moral education .
Attributes, skills and training of teachers . Teachers have the potential to
serve as significant role models for children in the area of moral education .
Given that the inductive power of models has been shown to be related to
perceived attributes of the model such as status, power, homophily, and
nurturance, teachers should be recruited not only on the basis of their abil-
ity to foster the intellectual development of children but, all things being
equal, on the basis of personal characteristics which make them potentially
significant role models for children. There can be no doubt that potential
teachers vary widely in how they are perceived by students and in their po-
tential to model behavior effectively. This capacity to model moral behavior
effectively is a critical one for moral education and attention to the specific
attributes of good role models is a crucial area for future inquiry in teacher
education .
Teachers' visible prosocial behavior within the community and school
provides one means by which students can gain moral insight and see po-
tential behaviors for modeling. The propensity to share with children the
moral dimensions of one's life, within, of course, educationally sound limits,
including the consequences involved for self and others, can broaden and
strengthen the child's view of what it means to behave in a morally respon-
sible manner . Teachers have the potential to be more than neutral dispens-
ers of knowledge; and, all things being equal, the skill, commitment, and
disposition for active involvement in the civic and moral life of society,
along with the propensity to share these experiences with children, should
be an important factor in recruitment and training of teachers . Teachers
should have a sophisticated and accurate knowledge of, and a strong per-
sonal commitment to, the moral rules which underpin our collective social
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life .3 The teacher must be able to verbalize these rules to children effec-
tively, interpret the rules as they apply to specific situations, and do so in a
manner that conveys commitment. The cognitive developmental approach
to moral reasoning provides valuable insight into the need for attention to
students' and teachers' levels of moral judgment with a view to obtaining
the degree of congruence necessary to insure meaningful communication . In
addition to training teachers to utilize stages of moral reasoning to improve
moral communication, prospective teachers should also receive training in
the most effective means of using inductive techniques ; that is, effectively
drawing childrens' attention to the consequences for themselves and others
of potential and real actions .
One of the few encouraging findings of Hartshorne and May (1928 )
was that, with respect to the incidence of deceit, classroom differences were
the rule rather than the exception (pp . 324-329) . These classroom differ-
ences persisted in student behavior even after a year . They were not to be
accounted for by differences in age, intelligence, or home background and
were found regardless of the type of school (progressive or traditional) . In
other words, this research suggests that the personal attributes of the
teacher and the climate established in the individual classroom have had a
significant and lasting impact on one form of moral behavior .
The Atmosphere and Curriculum of the School . In addition to the critical
role of the teacher, the atmosphere of the school, the social experiences of
the children in schools, and the subjects which children study are important
factors in the moral education of youth .
The atmosphere of school, to the extent that it involves a collective
group orientation, can provide two of the essential elements of morality
identified by Durkheim . Both attachment to the group and the spirit of dis-
cipline can be developed in school settings where group activity is valued
and where groups work collectively toward shared goals . Power and Reimer
(1978) describe the moral atmosphere of the Cluster School where collec-
tive self-government provides such a common goal . They describe how
moral rules come into being and how role conceptions evolve . Also impor-
tant in their analysis is how discipline, in terms of behavior, follows out of
the group activity. Although the specifics of the Cluster School appear not
to be easily transported to typical school settings, the dynamics involved
and their apparent impact on student behavior offer a promising validation
of Durkheim's theory and an exciting insight into individual moral develop-
ment in cooperative social contexts .
Individuals, who in dramatic and appealing ways are involved in the
care of others or in other ways represent action in the collective interest,
3I concur with Oliver and Shaver (1966) in this regard : ". . . the classroom is an inappropri-
ate place to subvert the ideals of society . . . if the teacher cannot in good faith operate from
the ideals of the society in which he lives, he should leave the society and teach somewhere
else or attempt to influence the adult community to change its value structure" (p . 10n) .
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should be brought into the school and allowed to share their experiences
and convictions with children . Creative strategies are also needed which
will allow youth to involve themselves in collective action in the collective
interest. Interage grouping where older children care for and instruct
younger children is one such possibility . Curriculum such as Bronfrenbren-
ner's (1978) recommendation of a "curriculum for caring" where children
engage in giving care under adult supervision is deserving of careful
scrutiny .
The school cannot ignore the diverse sources of values to which the
child is repeatedly exposed in the media, at home, and in the peer group . It
can be a confusing experience for the child and, if the school is to carry out
its mandate for moral education, it must assist the child in making sense of
these competing values in a manner that does not result in either slavish ac-
ceptance of any one view nor in transitory moral eclecticism. The school,
through its regular curriculum, can help the child to interpret and evaluate
the competing moral positions presented in terms of the moral rules of soci-
ety and such underlying core principles as justice and beneficence . In class-
room exercises, children can explore how specific behaviors are entailed by
commitment to specific values. The classroom can also be the place for fos-
tering the cognitive development necessary for the full understanding of our
social contractual democratic system of government . There has been much
work already done in the field of moral education which is useful to the
cognitive dimensions of moral education, i .e ., understanding moral con-
cepts, seeing relationships between choices and actions, following rules of
reason, etc . These approaches should continue to be utilized to the extent
that they make a contribution to this cognitive dimension of moral
education .
The content of curriculum, especially the social studies and the humani-
ties, offers the opportunity for students to reflect upon, from a broad social
and historical perspective, the fundamental necessities of collective life .
Through the study of morality, as revealed in history and literature, the in-
dividual can place his/her own personal experiences in a broader social con-
text, explore alternative views, and begin to develop his/her own under-
standing of the necessity of morality in social existence .
The difference between what I am advocating here and how I see moral
education as currently constituted is that education needs to stress that
there are, within any society at any given point in history, necessary limits
on individuals' socio-moral behavior . Hogan and Schroeder (1980) make
this point well when they state :
. . . so-called freedom is not possible in a social context . Nor in fact is
unalloyed happiness and personal fulfillment . Social living, which is
built into our bones, confers certain powerful benefits and advan-
tages-e.g., it makes us `free from' predators, starvation, and loneli-
ness . But it insures that we are not `free to' engage in theft, reckless
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self aggrandizement, or recreational sex with our neighbor's spouse or
children-no matter how personally fulfilling that might be . (p . 7 )
I might add to this, also, no matter how well rationalized those actions
might seem. Current approaches to moral education with the emphasis pri-
marily on decision making in problematic situations pay scant attention to
developing an appreciation for the benefits conferred by morality in social
life. In fairness it should be noted that the three major approaches to moral
education do not rule out the possibility of students deciding that enlight-
ened conformity to the normative structure of society is desirable . However,
more frequently than not, through the selection of content, limitations im-
posed on student inquiry and moral biases in the instruction, students are
led away from developing 'an appreciation for the necessity of rules in col-
lective life (Bennett and Delattre, 1978 ; Stewart, 1978) .
Consensus and Clarity . There is a prior task intricately involved with the
process of moral education which needs to be addressed if effective moral
education is to take place ; that is, a need to establish a continuing dialogue
and.search for the exact nature of the moral rules which govern our social
lives. These rules need to be formulated to the extent possible, unambigu-
ously and with the greatest probability for social consensus . Those areas
where no firm rules exist or where the correct application of a rule is un-
clear also need to be identified and honestly presented to children . We live
in a complex and rapidly evolving society and, although aspects of our
moral rules appear to shift in response to broader shifts in society, there ex-
ists a stable base which underpins all our social life . These rules need to be
formulated in a manner that is understandable to teachers and students
alike . In turn these rules can provide the vehicle for sequence in curriculum
as well as the perspective from which the individual comes to understand
his obligations. In other words, the content of moral education needs to be
spelled out . This content is not created by students, although they will nec-
essarily interpret it in light of their experiences .
The task of identifying the content of moral education (i .e ., the princi-
ples to be taught) is at the same time both difficult and easy . Before dis-
cussing this point further, however, the distinction made by W . D. Ross
(1930) between prima facie and actual duties may be useful . According to
Ross, what is actually right or obligatory (or actual duty) is what we actu-
ally ought to do in a specific situation . A prima facie duty is a duty, other
things being equal. That is, it would be an actual duty if other moral con-
siderations did not intervene. For example, we all may hold to the prima
facie rule that we ought to keep our promises, yet it may not be an actual
duty in a specific situation when, for example, another prima facie duty
(don't cause suffering) intervenes in the situation .
With careful study and wide-spread dialogue it should be possible to
agree on the nature of the prima facie moral duties embedded within the
social matrix. Certainly the vast majority of members of our society would
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agree that one ought to shun violence in the pursuit of personal goals, one
shouldn't steal that which does not belong to him/her, one should avoid in-
cest, one should eschew the reckless endangerment of life, one should honor
just contractual agreements, and the like . It is vitally important for the po-
tential success of a moral education program that there be significant com-
munity input and school/community agreement concerning the moral
norms which are to be the focus of instruction . Community/school task
groups must be set up with a responsibility of specifying the focus and lim-
its of the moral instruction which is to take place . Both agreement and dis-
agreement is likely . The resulting program may reflect reasoned compro-
mise between divergent positions or possibly a decision not to pursue moral
education with regard to specific issues . Regardless of the outcome of such
school/community deliberations, alternatives such as not involving the com-
munity, implementing programs clandestinely or hiding moral education
under more appealing labels (e.g ., citizenship education) do not establish a
firm foundation for a long-term successful program . Also, without
broadbased school/community dialogue the potential exists for small vocal
minorities to exert undue influence regarding single issues .
The widely held commitment to pluralism in the United States entails
local community control of schools . There are, however, limits on communi-
ties regarding the nature of the moral norms to be fostered and on the
rights of majority versus minority positions within the community . These
limits are to be found in the root values embedded within the Constitution
and specifically the Bill of Rights . For example, public schools do not have
the right, regardless of the extent of community agreement, to advocate ra-
cism or attempt to instill a sectarian religious perspective . Such activities
would on the one hand sanction racist behavior, which is immoral and ille-
gal, and on the other hand involve the schools in activities which are clearly
unconstitutional (the propagation of specific religious dogma in public
schools) . Ideally teachers will play a significant role in the formulation of
the goals of the moral education program through their participation in the
school/community dialogue.
Once the community's position is arrived at regarding the norms to be
taught this does not mean that ambiguity has been removed from moral
life . It is highly unlikely that certainty can ever be reached in the moral di-
mension of human existence . It is, however, for pedagogical purposes desir-
able to achieve the maximum clarity possible. Despite the best of efforts
uncertainty is likely to remain both in the identification and precise nature
of specific moral norms and in the proper interpretation of the application
of those norms to concrete situations . However, in spite of the inevitable
ambiguity in moral existence, it is socially preferable to have individuals
approach social life deeply committed to specific norms and reluctant to
break those norms (e.g., not stealing, honoring contracts) than to have a
citizenry capable of reaching elegant and refined decisions in situations of
moral uncertainty but lacking any allegiance to a socially based morality .
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Ideally, the morally educated individual will exhibit both a commitment to
agreed upon social norms and the ability, after cautious and thorough ex-
amination, to discern when not to engage in norm related behavior due to
the presence of higher moral duties in specific situations .
Persisting Problems in Moral Education
There are a variety of persisting and inescapable problems which dog-
gedly pursue anyone involved in moral education . In this final section I will
address variants of those problems which seem especially salient for the
functional perspective being advocated in this paper .
Rationality and indoctrination . Adults do not have absolute rights over
children ; however, they do have a responsibility to see that children grow
into healthy adults with the capacity for a successful and happy life in soci-
ety. This responsibility includes the right to use force or compulsion with
children and the right to condition their behavior to some extent . The task
for moral education is to carry out this responsibility for the nurturance of
youth in a manner that does not do harm to the child's intelligence, capac-
ity for rationality and future growth . Forms of conditioning, which produce
strong and irreversible irrational reactions to situations, cannot be a legiti-
mate goal for any moral education program . On the other hand, the giving
of reasons by adults has limited effect on children's behavior before a given
age, even if care is taken to insure that the reasons given are fully under-
stood in the manner intended by adults . The fallacy of existing efforts at
moral education has been to assume that with young children, we can avoid
the directive and non-rational in moral education and at the same time de-
velop in children a spirit of deference to the moral basis of social existence .
To advocate the utilization of non-rational methods in moral education
is not to endorse indoctrination . Indoctrination refers to attempts to influ-
ence others which distort, through oversimplification, misrepresentation
and/or one-sided presentation, a particular position or rule out fair and rea-
soned consideration of alternative positions . A more accurate term for the
position being advocated in this paper is directive moral education . Direc-
tive moral education refers to teacher advocacy of specific moral norms .
This may be accomplished without distorting alternative positions or pre-
cluding the examination of alternatives . Directive moral education does,
however, forcefully assert in a reasoned manner what the right behavior
may be for students in a specific moral context .
If it is accepted that the non-rational-that is, instructional methods
whose purpose is not, to develop decision making skills in children, such as
modeling behavior for children, discouraging certain forms of behavior with
accompanying reasons, involving children in prosocial acts, praising selected
acts, referring to morally exemplary behavior in community, media, or
literature, etc .-is necessary to instill the required commitment and defer-
ence to the moral order, then the goal of moral education is to accomplish
that important function in a manner which does not endanger the intelli-
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gence of the child or his emerging capacity for reflective thought . Ap-
proaches which produce strong, persisting, irrational reactions to moral life
will obviously hinder the child's development toward mature morality .
Moral education, as presented in this paper, is premised on the concept of a
"gradient of rationality ." Rationality should be constantly expanded as a
part of the moral education curriculum over the child's life in schools . Non-
rational methods of instruction should be a constantly decreasing compo-
nent of the child's schooling experience . There is no "age of reason" per
se when children become capable of reasoning about their moral experi-
ence. As Piaget and Kohlberg have shown, the capacity for thinking about
moral experience is common among children of all ages . That which differ-
entiates early from later practice in moral education is the decreasing em-
phasis on the teacher affirming specific moral standards, giving reasons for
certain actions, drawing attention to aversive consequences, etc ., and the re-
sultant shift to encouraging children to formulate actively their own under-
standing of their social and moral environment . The non-rational should not
be totally absent in the later stages of moral education nor should the ra-
tional be absent in very early education . At all levels both will be present ;
the precise balance is ultimately the domain of the informed and responsi-
ble judgment of the teacher.
Cultural pluralism and human rights . When one adopts the position that
the essence of moral life is to follow the specific moral rules which are em-
bedded within a societal framework, inevitably there will arise questions
concerning how one is to interpret the wide variety of rules which are found
to exist both within and between societies . As Durkheim (1973) points out,
the diversity of moral codes themselves is subordinate to a more universal
conception of morality :
. . . the state must commit itself to the goal of realizing among its
own people the general interests of humanity-committing itself to an
access of justice and organizing itself in such a way that there is al-
ways a clear correspondence between the merit of its citizens and their
conditions of life with an end of reducing or preventing individual suf-
fering. (p. 77)
In other words, the position taken is that there exist certain superordinate
moral principles to which all groups and societies are committed (e.g ., the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights) . These norms serve the general
interest of humanity, yet assume different forms at different times and
places. The actual duties of an individual within a society may vary . To the
extent that the actual duties presented to the members of a society by the
society are not consistent with the larger prima facie duties, they ought not
to be binding on that individual . Children need to be taught not only their
specific moral duties, but also an allegiance to the superordinate moral
principles. Making judgments concerning the consistency between the ac-
tual patterns of behavior in the child's smaller social setting and superordi-
nate moral principles should be a component of the moral education process .
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Habit and novelty in moral life . Any approach which emphasizes the rou-
tine and the rules which govern social life must recognize that at times indi-
viduals will be confronted with novel and unsettling situations to which
one's moral code does not appear to apply clearly . This is a significant area
of concern for any approach to moral education, but it must not be lost
sight of that in one's moral life most things are eventually reduced to habit
and routine. We cannot decide anew in every situation how we should act .
We must free ourselves from continual deliberation and introspection so
that we can devote ourselves with energy to the crucial situations when they
arise. The application of moral rules to new and novel situations defines an
important task of moral education, but does not, as many have advocated,
define the entire enterprise . Both the routine and the novel are a part of the
same moral orientation; in one case the application of rules to situations has
become routine, in the other case the rules' application must be done on an
ad hoc basis. In both cases, however, the nature of the rules and the acqui-
escence to those rules lie at the foundation of the moral orientation .
The problem of past failures of direct moral instruction . There can be no
question that curricular efforts based on direct moral instruction-instruc-
tion aimed at getting students to accept specific norms and act in specific
ways-have not met with great success . The findings of Hartshorne and
May (1928-30) in this regard have gone unchallenged over the past fifty
years. There are four major reasons for this failure. These reasons both il-
lustrate the limits and potential of any renewed efforts at direct moral in-
struction. First, prior approaches have not, in terms of the psychoanalytic
metaphor, allowed for the motivating power of irrational anxiety of the su-
perego to steadily give way to the more rational purposes of the ego . The
previous directive approaches, by not shifting emphasis to accomodate the
developmental changes in the child, have weakened their potential effective-
ness. Prior efforts have failed to devote sufficient attention to optimal
match for understanding relative to the stages of moral reasoning utilized
in communication between teachers and children . A wide discrepancy be-
tween higher stage communication of a teacher and lower levels of moral
development in the children insure a lack of meaningful communication . It
is reasonable to assume that among previous attempts at direct moral in-
struction such mismatches have occurred frequently .
Second, although there is evidence to indicate that teachers can make a
difference in having an impact on moral behavior, there is little information
concerning what attributes of classroom teachers, instructional methods,
and classroom climates facilitate effective moral education . Relevant find-
ings from such areas as social learning theory, modeling behaviors, induc-
tion, etc., have yet to be applied systematically to classroom settings and in
a controlled manner . In this area we have yet to build practice on available
scientific knowledge .
Third, the rapidly changing and complex value systems to which chil-
dren are exposed in a pluralistic, democratic society create unique problems
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for moral education . Consistency of values in the child's world makes in-
struction for those values a simple process and insures a high degree of suc-
cess. The task of the moral educator is much more difficult where the value
messages received by the child from his/her environment are inconsistent .
Finally, the societal demand for self-chosen identity as the central task of
adolescence necessarily involves a degree of moral redefinition with the
emerging identity . Such transformations in identity inevitably involve
changes in previous moral learnings .
The first two factors referred to above are areas that are within the con-
trol of curriculum planning and teacher educators . The last two areas are
problems which will continue to make the task of direct moral instruction
and other forms of moral education exceedingly difficult . The previous fail-
ure of directive moral education is, therefore, the result of weaknesses
within the method itself and larger societal forces . A reexamination of the
need for direct moral instruction, along with the advances realized by con-
temporary moral education, offers the hope for constructing a moral educa-
tion program that produces a commitment to the moral life as well as the
skills to live that life creatively in a complex and rapidly changing world .
Functionalist Theory, Social Justice and the Problem of Change . As men-
tioned above, the social theory underlying the perspective on moral educa-
tion presented in this paper is essentially functionalist in nature . Function-
alist theory focuses on the homeostatic mechanisms by which societies
maintain a uniform state and contains a strong conservative bias toward the
undesirability of any but adaptive change. Any social theory which has im-
plications for moral education must, in contemporary Western society, be
able to address the issues of autonomy, basic human rights and the quest
for social justice, for these concerns are deeply embedded within the socio-
moral ethos of Western society . Although it is beyond the scope of this pa-
per to present a detailed defense of functional theory, I will present a brief
discussion of what I see as. some common misconceptions concerning the
theory's implications for educational practice .
It is not the case that functionalist social theory entails the uncritical
transmission of all existing contemporary moral standards . It is a rather ob-
vious example of the naturalistic fallacy to assume that moral norms ought
to be perpetuated simply because they exist. Durkheim provides two impor-
tant qualifications in this regard . As noted above he clearly states that the
existing socio-moral-legal structure of society should be subordinate to the
general interests of humanity. Of clear concern to Durkheim is that the so-
cial system be just and exist ultimately to reduce human suffering . I would
add that in contemporary American society existing socio-moral-legal
structures are more specifically subordinate to the rights guaranteed in our
Constitution. It is clearly possible for schools to teach for a commitment to
the basic moral norms of society and at the same time identify examples of
social practices within the system which are in violation of this normative
structure and therefore constitute a threat to societal stability . For exam-
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ple, the still unfinished quest by blacks in American society for justice and
the significant role in that quest played by Martin Luther King well illus-
trate how contemporary social practices may be challenged from a broader
moral perspective, and how society can adaptively achieve social progress .
The quest for bringing the social reality in line with the moral ideal is a
continuing process of social evolution which occurs through the dynamics of
social stress and resultant adjustment .
A second misconception of functionalist theory is that the goal of the
educative process is to develop in students a slavish and unreflective accept-
ance of current moral norms . This interpretation is somewhat puzzling in
light of the attention which Durkheim (1963) devotes to the importance of
automony in moral education (pp. 95-126) . It is not enough that we blindly
conform to the moral order . The end state of moral development according
to Durhkeim is enlightened allegiance to the moral order . We liberate our-
selves from slavish and blind conformity through understanding ; knowing
the reasons for the moral order. Durkheim (1963) states that " . . . to
teach morality is neither to preach nor indoctrinate; it is to explain" (p .
120) . To the extent that children come to understand the necessity for so-
cially imposed limits on their behavior they can freely conform. But Durk-
heim does not assume that this conformity is reached uncritically, for to the
extent that we understand we can also check the extent to which the moral
order is founded in the nature of society-to what extent it is what it ought
to be. At this level the teachers' role will involve assisting youth to examine
and evaluate the functional nature of the moral framework .
To summarize, the functional perspective of moral education suggests
that schools should not only attempt to instill in students a commitment to
the moral order through persuasive presentation of moral norms, but also
should gradually develop in students an understanding of the need for a
normative structure in society . In addition, schools will be involved in hav-
ing students compare the extent to which the moral norms contribute to the-
well being of society and its members and evaluate the extent to which the
moral norms of a society are consistent with the higher ideals of mankind .
Clearly this conception goes far beyond the easy characterization of slavish
conformity as the end goal of Durkheimian moral education .
Functionalism rejects the social reconstructionist view that schools
should play a central role in the social and moral transformation of society .
It is apparent from a reading of the history of education that schools re-
spond to societal needs rather than instigate social change . As Katz (1971)
has observed from his study at efforts at educational reform, "Despite sub-
stantial financing and a captive audience, the schools have not been able to
attain the goals set for them . . . They have been unable to do so because
those goals have been impossible to fulfill . They require fundamental social
reform, not the sort of tinkering that educational change has represented"
(p. 141) .
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Conclusion
In this paper I have attempted to identify what I see as the major weak-
nesses in contemporary moral education . To place these weaknesses in per-
spective, I have compared the assumptions of moral education with the evi-
dence regarding the development of prosocial behavior and with the
perspective of Emile Durkheim . I have argued that contemporary moral ed-
ucation, by emphasizing exclusively the fostering of individual rationality
has both neglected the very real collective demands of social life and pos-
ited a restrictive view of the moralization process . The development of rea-
son cannot be the only goal of moral education . A commitment to collective
ends and the discipline necessary to function with collective life are also es-
sential ingredients of moral life .
The position that the development of reason alone is insufficient to in-
sure moral character is not a new argument . Over two millenia ago Aris-
totle argued the same position in rebuttal to Plato . Aristotle's position
(Ross, 1969), which is similar to that of Durkheim, was that moral educa-
tion is fundamentally political education, and moral and civil law represent
a systematic and concrete expression of the moral idea ; that is, a tested
conception of the good life . Aristotle held that learning to act rightly can
only be accomplished by habituation (ethismos) . As R. S . Peters (1967)
has succinctly noted, "The palace of reason has to be entered by courtyard
of habit" (p. 24). The goal of moral education is to transform the early
emotional traits, developed through ethismos, into intelligent dispositions
of good character . This is accomplished through instruction in the princi-
ples of right action . But this instruction will be successful only if students
are first enamored with what is truly noble. Mature moral character is
reached only when habit (emotion) is united with and informed by princi-
ples of reason .
In this paper I have in effect argued for an Aristotelian view of moral
education. I have attempted to demonstrate that research into the develop-
ment of prosocial behavior and structural-functional theory offer strong and
persuasive evidence supporting this position .
Moral confusion, injustice, and rapidly changing social patterns con-
front the society of the child and the educator . The challenge of moral edu-
cation in these times is to redefine our societal commitment to the general
welfare, justice, and human dignity in a way that is compatible with con-
temporary life so as to provide a stable basis for the moral nurturance of
the young . The weakness of current approaches to moral education is not in
what they advocate, but rather in the failure to attempt to develop a com-
mitment to the moral rules of society .
The trend among youth, and society at large, is toward egoism and
withdrawal. Unless the next generation possesses a commitment for the
moral rules necessarily entailed in collective life, rather than for mere ver-
bal skills, the future of our society is questionable . Moral education needs
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to redirect itself from the exclusive focus on rationality and strive for a pro-
gram which balances instilling a commitment to moral rules accompanied
with the rationality necessary to deal effectively with the moral crises of
contemporary life .
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Man: A Course of Study (MACOS) is "one of the most important ef-
forts of our time to relate research findings and theory in education psy-
chology to the development of new and better instructional materials ." So
said the American Textbook Publishers Institute and the American Educa-
tional Research Association in February 1969 when both groups coalesced
to honor Jerome Bruner, former director of the MACOS project (Dow,
1975a, p. 395) .
MACOS is "a godawful course," charged then-Congressman John B .
Conlon (R-Arizona) to the House Committee on Science and Technology
in April 1975 . Conlon, leader of the anti-MACOS forces, condemned its
"abhorrent, repugnant, vulgar, morally sick content" (Nelkin, 1977, p .
112) .
The Need for a New Kind of Curriculum . Two unrelated events set the stage
for the development of MACOS and other new social studies curricula .
Sputnik was the first . Millions of federal dollars were pumped hurriedly
into school mathematics and science programs in an effort to "catch up to
the Russians ." Social studies was not far behind . To project a new image of
respectability (and to be in a better position to get curriculum development
projects funded) social studies education gave way to a new, discipline-
centered ideology . Social science education was born .
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The second event leading to social studies curriculum reform was the
now-famous Woods Hole Conference . In September 1959 a Who's Who of
thirty-five scientists, scholars, and educators led by Jerome Bruner met to
consider how the teaching of science, including social science, might be im-
proved in the nation's schools . Many of the conference recommendations
found their way into the development of MACOS .
Jerome Bruner authored the conference report, a 92 page book entitled
The Process of Education . Relying heavily on the work of Piaget and In-
helder in his book, Bruner recommended that instruction be sequenced ac-
cording to the spiral curriculum, in which concepts are introduced to the
child at an early age then reconsidered in a more complex way later . The
goal of this approach, he suggested, is to "seek to create an ever more ex-
plicit and mature understanding . . ." (Bruner, 1960, p . 53) .
Three additional elements important in curriculum development, ac-
cording to Bruner, are the roles of teaching aids, the teacher, and the stu-
dents. Teaching aids, he wrote, are useful in "extending the student's range
of experience, in helping him to understand the underlying structure of the
material he is learning, and in dramatizing the significance of what he is
learning" (Bruner, 1960, p . 84) .
" [T] he principal aid in the teaching process as it is practiced in our
schools," offered Bruner, is "the teacher" (Bruner, 1960, p . 88) . He elabo-
rated that one of the teacher's major responsibilities is to ask questions of
the students which will move them "to a deeper understanding of [the dis-
cipline's] principles" (Bruner, 1960, p . 40) .
The student's role, according to Bruner, is threefold : to acquire new in-
formation, to transform or manipulate it so that it can be applied to new
tasks, and to evaluate the extent to which manipulation is adequate and ap-
propriate (Bruner, 1960, p . 48) .
Application of Bruner's Theory to MACOS . The opportunity to put his the-
ory into practice came in 1964 when Bruner assumed the directorship of
the MACOS development project . Concerned about "the growing separa-
tion of first-rank scholars and scientists from the task of presenting their
own subjects in primary and secondary schools" (Bruner, 1960, p . 3), he
collaborated with anthropologists, biologists, and social psychologists to de-
velop the discipline-based curriculum .
"The goals of the program," wrote Peter Dow, MACOS director from
1966 until its completion, "are threefold : to give the students a set of mod-
els for thinking about the world, to provide them with some intellectual
tools for investigating human behavior, and to evoke in children an appreci-
ation of the common humanity that all human beings share" (Dow, 1975a,
p. 389) . The influence of the discipline-centered scholars can clearly be
seen in the goals of MACOS .
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Another application of Bruner's theory in the year-long MACOS pro-
gram is the sequencing of concepts according to the spiral curriculum view .
The concepts of life cycle, parenting, innate and learned behavior, adapta-
tion, language and communication, social organization, culture, environ-
ment, and values and belief systems are introduced simply at first then in a
more complex way later as children study salmon, herring gulls, baboons,
and finally, a human society-the Netsilik Eskimos .
Bruner's idea about the selection and use of teaching aids is also observ-
able in MACOS. Students' experiences are broadened by extensive use of a
wide variety of media: booklets, films, sound recordings, simulation games,
role playing, charts, maps, model building, and a field diary . Teachers'
guides suggest ways in which these materials can be used to help children
understand concepts, ask questions, and generate a sense of excitement and
discovery as the question "What makes people human?" is considered .
The teacher's role as communicator, model, and identification figure, as
set forth by Bruner (1960, p . 91), is elaborated on in MACOS teachers'
guides. To learn these roles teachers must take instruction in content, child
development, learning theory, and teaching strategies . Learning to ask ap-
propriate questions is emphasized in the training .
Consistent with Bruner's theory, MACOS students go far beyond sim-
ply acquiring information . They continually transform knowledge so that it
applies to new settings . Both intuitive and analytic thinking take place as
students explore concepts .
The selection of a human society to include in MACOS was given care-
ful consideration by its developers. The Netsilik Eskimos of Northern Can-
ada were chosen because their culture contrasts profoundly with that of the
United States. Such contrast was essential, thought the designers, so . that
students could begin to grasp the great divergence implicit within the con-
cept of humankind .
Bruner and his colleagues were well aware that inclusion of the Netsilik
case study was bound to precipitate controversy. Rather than avoid the is-
sue, they hoped that moral questions related to the life style and belief sys-
tem of the Netsilik "could be dealt with in a spirit of open scientific inquiry
free from prejudice and ignorance" (Nelkin, 1977, p . 31) . The nature and
magnitude of protests against MACOS dashed such hopes .
Charges Against MACOS. Does MACOS, which was federally funded until
1975 by the National Science Foundation, encourage children to accept
values which are inconsistent with those of a large segment of American so-
ciety? Does exposure to this curriculum cause children to become more ac-
cepting of cruelty to animals, divorce, cannibalism, murder, senilicide, and
female infanticide? These and other charges have appeared not only in the
popular press (Redbook, April 1976 ; The Reader's Digest, January 1976 ;
Chicago Daily News, February 13, 1976 ; and The Atlanta Journal, April
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8, 1976), but in the professional literature as well ( The Chronicle of
Higher Education, March 31, 1975 ; APA Monitor, July 1975 ; Phi Delta
Kappan, October 1975 ; and Social Education, October 1975) .'
Purpose
Because the charges against MACOS have tended to be based on opin-
ion rather than research, the purpose of this study was to examine empiri-
cally the influence of MACOS on the attitudes of children toward six prac-
tices: cruelty to animals, divorce, cannibalism, murder, senilicide, and
female infanticide .
Method
The Sample and the Setting . Ninety-five (95) fourth-grade students who at-
tended the same school in a suburban, upper-middle class neighborhood
near a major southeastern city participated in the study . The students were
predominantly white ; there were approximately equal numbers of boys and
girls .
Because of school policy, the study was conducted with four intact so-
cial studies classes . The two experimental (MACOS) classes were housed
in a large, open-space classroom and were team taught by two teachers .
The actual teaching of MACOS was done by the teacher who had com-
pleted NSF-sponsored MACOS training at a nearby university . Though
MACOS was taught to the experimental group for the entire year, the
treatment was limited only to the duration of the study of the Netsilik
Eskimo.
The two control (non-MACOS) classes were located in a similar large,
open space and were taught by two different teachers . Neither teacher of
the control group had received training in MACOS . All teachers were in
their third or fourth year of teaching; none had earned any academic de-
gree beyond the bachelor's .
The four participating classes consisted of heterogeneously grouped chil-
dren. There is no reason to believe that systematic differences existed be-
tween the groups that influenced the outcome of the study .
The Attitude Scale . An 18-item attitudinal inventory was constructed by the
investigators. Items were constructed so as to relate to six of the practices
most commonly noted by critics of MACOS as objectionable . Sample items
are presented in Table 1 . 2
'We have cited references by publication, rather than by author, to illustrate the breadth of
the publication of the criticisms against MACOS . However, they are listed by author on the
reference page.
Me complete instrument is available upon request from the first author .
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Table 1 : Sample Items From the Attitudinal Inventory
1 . A young couple had a baby girl who was born without arms . Although the child
was mentally normal the mother felt the child would not live a happy life . So the
mother killed the baby girl. Do you agree with the mother that the girl was
better off dead?
(Female Infanticide)
2. Recently there appeared a television special about a couple who after 20 years of
marriage got divorced. When one of the five children was asked how she felt
about her parents splitting up she replied, "the divorce was really a relief ." After
seven years the arguing and fighting had finally stopped between the parents . Do
you agree with the daughter that it was right for this couple to get divorced?
(Divorce)
3 . A middle aged man fired his gun at two robbers who entered his home in the
middle of the night . When the police arrived they found the two robbers dead
with a cash box containing $20 and a screwdriver next to the bodies on the floor .
Do you agree with the middle aged man that it was right to shoot and kill the
robbers?
(Murder)
4. Recently a famous person became concerned about a horse she found who had
been neglected by his owner. This horse had not been fed in days by the owner
and was about to die . Do you agree with the horse's owner that he did not have
to feed the animal?
(Cruelty to Animals)
5 . The book Last Rights, by Mary Mannes, described the feelings of a daughter as
she saw her father in the hospital. "He's 80 years old with terminal cancer,
cancer that cannot be cured and stuck full of tubes . Of course he couldn't move
or speak." He needs the tubes to keep him alive . Medical care is very expensive
in the United States. Sometimes families cannot afford to take care of the old
and they must give up the things they need, such as food and clothing for their
children . Under these circumstances, do you agree that the old should be kept
alive?
(Senilicide)
6. A plane crashed in 1972 and efforts to find it were unsuccessful . Unfortunately
there were only 16 people on board the plane who survived . High in the
mountains where the plane crashed there was no food, such as plants or animals,
in sight . The people were very hungry and weak because they had not eaten for
days. One of the survivors was so hungry that he got the idea to eat the bodies of
the people who died . This source of meat and protein would provide them with
strength to walk around and look for help . He and the others were unsure what
to do at first . However, under such terrible and unusual conditions they had no
other choice available to them if they wanted to stay alive . In your opinion do
you agree that under these circumstances this was the right thing to do?
(Cannibalism)
The development of the attitudinal inventory deserves further comment .
Obviously, the aspects of MACOS criticized in the popular and profes-
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sional press are controversial topics . Therefore, rather than have the stu-
dents respond to attitude items such as "one should never abuse animals,"
we searched newspaper and magazine accounts, collections of fairy tales,
and plots of then current movies for illustrations . Initially, about 30 items
were developed. To insure that the items were getting at the target criti-
cisms, a panel of judges (professors of education) independently catego-
rized the items . The 18 items in the final version of the instrument were
those on which the judges had complete unanamity of categorization . The
process of exhaustively searching the literature for criticisms and of having
judges match the items to the criticisms insured a high degree of content
validity .
The attitudinal inventory was administered to a comparable group of
fourth grade students in the same school who did not participate in the
study. Reliability was estimated by the test-retest approach to be .84 for
the total score .
Care was taken to make certain that the vocabulary on the instrument
was within the students' comprehension level .
Three questions were asked about each of the six practices that
MACOS critics have focused on (murder, senilicide, etc .). All questions
were randomly ordered . For each "negatively" written item the possible re-
sponses and the corresponding numerical scoring were : strongly agree (1) ;
agree (2) ; neutral (3) ; disagree (4) ; and strongly disagree (5) . The
weights were reversed for the "positively" stated items . Items numbered 1,
2, 3, 4, and 6, which appear in Table 1, represent illustrations of "nega-
tively" written items-items about which the respondents were asked their
degree of agreement with practices the critics consider to be objectionable .
Item 5, included as a reliability check, was phrased so as to ask the stu-
dents' degree of agreement with a practice the critics find to be acceptable .
Thus, larger scores are indicative of disagreement with "unacceptable"
practices and of agreement with "acceptable" practices .
Apart from the attitudinal concerns of the present study, participating
MACOS students were also administered a posttest of their cognitive
achievement to ascertain whether or not they actually received the
MACOS treatment . On a 66 item test of knowledge, comprehension and
application of facts and concepts, the MACOS group mean percentage
score correct was 70 . The standard deviation was 9 . The Kuder-Richardson
formula 20 reliability coefficient for this test was .91 .
Because of the constraint of working with intact groups, we adopted a
Campbell and Stanley (1963) non-equivalent control-group quasi-experi-
mental design . All subjects were pretested with the 18 item attitudinal in-
ventory prior to the time the experimental group began the study of the
Netsilik Eskimo, the MACOS unit identified by its critics as a major
source of their concerns .
40
Treatment . Following the pretest administration of the attitudinal inven-
tory, the two experimental classes, which consisted of 49 students, studied
'the Netsilik Eskimos for seven weeks as part of their MACOS program .
MACOS materials were used in accordance with the suggestions provided
in the teachers' manuals .
During the same seven week period, the two control classes, consisting
of 46 students, studied their regular social studies curriculum which was
based largely on the Level 4 text, Concepts and Values, Brandwein, et al .,
published by Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich .
' Results
Pretest and posttest means and standard deviations for MACOS and
control classes are presented in Table 2 .
Table 2: Pretest and Posttest Means and Standard Deviations for
MACOS and Control Classes
The data were treated as if each of the six criticism subscales (three
items per subscale) were a dependent variable. Although not estimated, we
assumed that the reliability of the 'subscales was low . Since, however, our
purpose was comparing groups and not making individual assessments, we
believed that we were still on firm methodological ground (see Millman
and Gowen, 1974, p. 90) . Additionally, scores on all 18 items were summed
to give a total score .
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NON MACOS (N = 46)
Pretest Posttest
Criticism X SD . X SD
Animal Cruelty 11 .76 2 .36 12 .15 1 .90
Female Infanticide 13 .78 1 .85 13 .65 2 .06
Senilicide 10.67 1 .98 10 .20 1 .39
Divorce 7 .96 1 .89 7 .63 2 .04
Murder 11 .46 1 .79 11 .65 1 .57
Cannibalism 11 .63 1 .71 . 11 .76 1 .27
Total, 67 .26 6 .09 66.78 4 .35
MACOS (N = 49)
Pretest
	
Posttest
Criticism X SD X SD
Animal Cruelty 11 .78 1 .77 11 .73 1 .89
Female Infanticide 13 .29 2.58 13 .14 2 .20
Senilicide .10.45 1 .78 10 .24 2 .05
Divorce 7 .65 2.02 6 .79 2 .19
Murder 12 .02 1 .63 11 .43 1 .77
Cannibalism 11.69 1 .65 11 .06 2.06
Total 67.10 5 .00 64.16 5 .49
Independent t tests were computed to compare treatment and control
groups. With respect to the pretest, there were no significant differences at
the .05 level between MACOS and control students on any of the six sub-
scales or the total test . This after-the-fact analysis strengthened our as-
sumption that the two groups were equivalent .
To compare the possible differences in attitude changes between the
MACOS and non-MACOS groups, a Hotelling's T 2 (a statistical proce-
dure that is the multivariate generalization of the common t test) was com-
puted. The dependent variables were the six difference scores (post minus
pre) for the subscales . The comparison was not statistically significant (T 2
= 7.094, F = 1 .19, df = 2, 88, p < .358). In addition, univariate indepen-
dent is (MACOS vs. non-MACOS) were computed for each subscale
(post minus pre) . None was significant (p > .05) .
Discussion
In our experiment the study of MACOS produced no significant attitu-
dinal change of children toward cruelty to animals, divorce, murder, senili-
cide, and female infanticide when each of these topics was tested separately
or when they were grouped together . Contrary to the charges of the critics,
very little emphasis is placed on these topics in the MACOS program .
It might be worth observing that, although statistically insignificant, the
MACOS group seemed to become slightly more tolerant of "repugnant"
activities than did the non-MACOS group . A reexamination of Table 2
shows that, for the MACOS group, posttest means were smaller than the
corresponding pretest means (smaller scores reflect more accepting atti-
tudes). By contrast, the pattern for the non-MACOS group is mixed
(again, see Table 2) .
The values-neutral orientation of the scholars and scientists who con-
tributed to the development of MACOS may account for these slightly di-
vergent patterns . The social science philosophy underlying the development
of MACOS seeks to teach children what is, not what ought to be . It was
not the intent of the developers to inculcate in students the values of either
the American or Netsilik societies . Rather, they designed the curriculum in
such a way that children could reflect and inquire, much as a social scien-
tist does, into the nature of humankind within a conceptual framework .
A second hypothesis regarding the lack of major effects on the attitudes
of MACOS students is that the treatment was too short to influence values .
An aspect of this hypothesis is the unavoidable confounding of teacher and
treatment .
A third hypothesis is that the influence of family, church, and other so-
cietal institutions are so strong as to preclude any significant change by ex-
posure to a given social studies curriculum .
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Were the critics right about MACOS? We think not . Within the limita-
tions of our study, we found no convincing empirical support for their
charges .
Our appreciation is extended to John Neel and William Curlette for their assistance with the
statistical analysis .
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Elementary School Teachers' Planning for
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When making plans about practical problems of life, such as what to
have for dinner, where to plant vegetables in the garden, and the best order
for running errands, people probably follow different patterns of planning .
We can conjecture that differences are probably due to the nature of the
event or task to be planned as well as differences in styles of thinking
among people .
For example, Mozart conceived of an entire piece of music before he
wrote a score . Clearly, he composed rapidly and with ease, for in barely
thirty years, he composed over 600 pieces of music, including 41 sympho-
nies, and 40 operas and masses . Beethoven, although he was also prolific,
approached his task quite differently . He wrote a score several times, cross-
ing out phrases or entire themes in various drafts of a score . So, while Mo-
zart planned the entire work mentally before putting pen to paper, Beetho-
ven thought on paper and worked a piece out while in the act of scoring it
(Gardner, 1980) . This difference may be partly attributable to the times
surrounding Mozart and Beethoven . The former composed in an era of ad-
herence to form, one which may have permitted him to plan a piece in his
head; Beethoven, living in an era where more experimentation was permit-
ted, 'was able to alter his plans continually, revising and scratching out
whole passages .
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Although we have evidence that people think and plan differently, one
model of planning is presented in educational literature, with few excep-
tions . Over the last twenty years or so, most of this literature has presented
planning as an objectives-first activity . That is, first, one is to specify the
objective, then an activity for meeting that objective, and finally a way of
assessing whether students have met the objective . Teachers are to know in
advance of an activity the specifics of what is to transpire, and to aim for
the ends of that activity rather than concentrating on means or considering
both .
However, increasing evidence indicates that many teachers do not natu-
rally follow this objectives-first model of planning . If they do, it is because
principals require them to do so, and they follow along by using an objec-
tives-first format when they write their plans in planbooks to please the
powers-that-be . But when they plan activities, the objectives-first model
does not appear to enter into the thinking of many teachers .
For example, most teachers do not appear to begin their planning by
considering the objectives or concepts ; rather, they begin by thinking about
students and activities (Clark, 1978; Mann, 1975 ; Merriman, 1976; Taylor,
1970) or, in the case of art, the availability of materials (Kleinberg and
Crozier, 1978) . Many teachers also alter plans during their enactment for a
variety of reasons. Like Beethoven (only in action, rather than on paper),
this alteration occurs on the spot as teachers perceive difficulties or better
ways of engaging students. The research reported here further indicates
planning to be an almost simultaneous juggling of many practical
considerations .
Perhaps the objectives-first model has persisted because it seems to cur-
riculum theorists as if it should work. Based on a view of idealized practice
rather than on research, theorists may have conjured up a rational view of
planning that does not describe practice . The model may also appeal to
those who believe we can and should rationally control the curriculum . Ad-
ditionally, since most descriptive studies of planning are less than a decade
old, theorists may not yet have had time to incorporate findings from de-
scriptive studies into models and theories about planning . Cognitive psy-
chologists' studies of thinking are also relatively recent, so ideas regarding
various forms of thinking-left hemispheric and right, vertical and lateral,
logical and metaphoric-may not as yet have been seen by curriculum the-
orists to have implications for how teachers plan .
Based on research, what do we know about planning for social studies
and other subjects? When teachers plan, what do they consider? What in-
fluences their plans? What implications can we draw from the research for
teacher education and for schools?
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In 1978, a team of four researchers' and twelve teachers studied those
twelve teachers' planning for lessons in all subjects in their elementary
school classrooms . The teachers represented three Virginia school systems
(city, smaller city, and rural county), two schools from each system and
two teachers from each school . Care was taken to ensure the representation
of all grade levels (first through sixth), but other than that criterion, we se-
lected !the twelve teachers by flipping through central office personnel lists .
Researchers worked in each classroom for several hours weekly to study
the planning process, the enactment of lessons emerging from the plans,
and various factors influencing plans . Information was collected from a va-
riety of sources such as anecdotal records of observations in classrooms,
notes based on informal interviews, administrative memos, transcripts of
meetings with teachers and administrators, teachers' planbooks, teachers'
guides to textbooks and children's daily work. Teachers were interviewed
about their planning processes and influences they perceived on their plan-
ning. Classroom observations were made to discover the nature of lessons
and to provide the basis for questions about planning .
In addition, administrators joined us for one meeting and the twelve
teachers for another meeting to discuss issues about planning and our pre-
liminary discoveries . Teachers volunteered a great deal of information dur-
ing our visits and during the meetings, raising salient issues as they became
involved in wondering about how they planned and why they chose one ac-
tivity over another. Administrators also raised several questions about plan-
ning. The study, then, employed ethnographic methods of observation and
informal interview, but also involved teacher collaboration .
The first section of this paper discusses planning processes and influ-
ences of planning on the curriculum, with a focus on social studies . The sec-
ond section discusses influences on teachers' plans . The final section dis-
cusses implications of the study. In practice, the planning processes, the
resultant curriculum, and influences on planning are not separate . They
flow into and influence one another . However, for purposes of discussion,
they have been separated .
Planning Processes
Plans in the Planbook. When we consider teachers' planning, we usually
think about the notes they write in their planbooks . In planbooks, teachers
tended to list the activities, textbook, or teacher guide page numbers and
perhaps a few words about concepts to be covered . One teacher's plan for a
reading group and a social studies lesson was written in this fashion :
Reading
Group B: p. 134 suffixes er, est . Seatwork-WB p. 29 and ditto# 18
' This project was supported by funding from The Ford Foundation (Project 785-0160) . As-
sisting me in the research were Michael Bentley, Diane W . Kyle, and Lee Mallen . The
teachers and school systems involved remain anonymous, however .
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& 19, completing sentences . Read together 92-98 story,
answer ?'s aloud in TG p . 135 .
Social Studies
pictures on 129-134 re transp . i n diff . cos . Discuss transp .
here .
In plans such as these teachers listed topics, concepts, skills and activities to
be sure to cover, written in abbreviated form . The plans tended to focus on
what the teacher or the children were to do rather than on what was to be
learned . Teachers glanced at plans before a lesson as a reminder of what to
do. As such, planbook plans resembled a shopping list and, like shopping
lists, they functioned as a memory jogger . As one teacher reflected,
This is what I have to be sure to do each day in addition to all the
other things I do each day that are fairly routine, like collecting lunch
money and checking on overdue library books .
Just as we usually cross out items as we locate them when we shop, teach-
ers usually checked off lessons as they were completed . This sort of plan-
ning, then, was a reminder of the planned activities and changes in rou-
tines, such as those due to dismissal for snow days or unscheduled
assemblies. Teachers drew arrows from the old time slot to a new one,
rescheduling the plans .
One teacher also noted concepts or activities she had not planned that
arose during the course of the day . As she reported,
Some of these [unplanned topics] come from the kids . Others I bring
up as I see a natural tie-in with current events or with other things
we're studying . So I write them down so I don't forget what else we
covered .
Her list, then, covered not only what she planned for the day, but also what
transpired that she had not planned . It was a history of her curriculum and
had the advantage of reminding her of what occurred, rather than only
what she planned in advance; this permitted her to relate and build upon
activities . If she did not record the activities, she ran the risk of forgetting
them. Her planbook functioned, then, to remind her of what do do, but also
to remind her of past events for her future planning .
Whether in social studies or in other lessons, teachers did not usually
list objectives in their planbooks unless a principal had such a requirement .
In their views, this was unnecessary because objectives were listed in the
teachers' guides and several teachers believed objectives were implicit in ac-
tivities . Some teachers also aimed for diverse outcomes among their stu-
dents and did not want to focus on only one. Most believed it was a waste
of time and not helpful to list objectives .
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Principals required daily lesson plans, and all principals collected
planbooks at some time, weekly or monthly . Principals gave several reasons
for requiring written plans :
It clarifies the teachers' ideas about what they're going to do toNave
to write it down .
It lets me know where the teachers are in what books . If they're get-
ting behind, I can check on it .
Lesson plans are needed for substitutes.
In the second comment, we can also see that at least one principal of
the six desired to control what occurred in classrooms . As one teacher
responded,
How can he tell where I should be? He doesn't live in the room . I'm
the one who can decide how fast to go through the books . But he does
tell us to go faster sometimes-never slower .
With regard to the final reason, most teachers (seven of twelve) re-
ported they wrote separate plans for a substitute to follow rather than leav-
ing the substitute with only a planbook; two others left a folder to orient
the substitute to routines . Teachers wrote different plans for substitutes for
several reasons . If teachers considered a topic to be fundamental or highly
important, or were beginning a topic or skill, they wanted to teach it them-
selves.They also reported that they planned activities for substitutes that
were routine, not highly unusual, to minimize discipline problems . They re-
ported that since they did not know which substitute teacher would be sent,
they could not tailor plans unless it was a long-term absence and continuity
in the assignment of the substitute had been assured .
How did these twelve teachers arrive at the shorthand description in
their planbook of what was to occur in a lesson? What thoughts entered the
teachers' minds? What did they consider?
Mental Planning . Perhaps the richest form of teachers' planning we ex-
amined was the complex mental dialogue, the reflective thinking, many
went through before writing these plans or teaching a lesson . Part of this
plan was outlined in planbooks, but much of it never appeared on paper .
Part of the mental dialogue resembled a rehearsal of the lesson, an envi-
sioning of what teachers believed might happen . And, part of the dialogue
was a reflection on what happened previously during the year or what hap-
pened in other years when a similar lesson was taught . Experienced teach-
ers had a larger repertoire of past lessons to consider than did novice
teachers .
Dewey (1922) could have been discussing teacher planning when he
discussed deliberation :
We begin with a summary assertion that deliberation is a dramatic re-
hearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of ac-
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tion . . . Deliberation is an experiment in finding out what the various
lines of possible action are really like. It is an experiment in making
various combinations of selected elements of habits and impulses, to
see what the resultant action would be like it if were entered upon . But
the trial is in imagination, not in overt fact . . . . An act overtly tried
out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out . An act tried
out in imagination is not final or fatal . It is retrievable. (p. 190)
Deliberation implies considering alternatives . What alternatives did
these twelve teachers consider when planning? Two teachers followed their
own unit plans in social studies, and the other ten teachers derived their
plans from texts . All twelve relied on the textbook for all other subjects,
with the exception of art ; plans for art were related to seasons or upcoming
holidays and were drawn from suggestions in books that had been used in
art education courses or from suggestions in teachers' journals such as The
Instructor. Because of this heavy reliance on texts, the alternatives usually
considered when teachers planned revolved around practical questions such
as whether to ask all the questions in the teachers' guide, whether to con-
trive other questions, and whether to use an alternative to the strategy sug-
gested in the guide . Often these questions were weighed by logistical con-
siderations such as the amount of time available, the materials the teacher
might use, and how easy the activity seemed to control, given the nature of
the class. As one teacher stated,
Most of my decisions aren't really decisions because the textbooks are
mandated, and we only have one text for each subject . So I really
haven't any choice in the matter .
In Virginia, as in several other states, school districts adopt one text for
each subject ; the text is selected from a list developed at the state level .
Roughly half (24 of 50) of the states develop such a list (Bowler, 1978) .
Teachers appeared to make decisions about various lessons from text-
books based on answers to questions such as :
Can I control this activity?
Do I have enough materials for this lesson?
Have similar activities worked for me in the past?
Do these children need to learn this, or do they already know it?
Will this activity fit into the amount of time I have?
Could I ask better questions than the ones in the teacher's guide?
How can I relate it to what they already know or experience in their
daily lives and to other things they're doing?
Could I do part of this activity as board work for one group while I
work with another group?
Are the children likely to be able to do it?
Are there problems with the lesson, errors in the book?
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These practical questions were considered almost simultaneously as teach-
ers decided whether to use -a suggestion in the teachers' guide . As one
teacher said,
The subconscious does a lot of sorting for you . You can think of many
thlings almost simultaneously . The sorting is rapid, not logical or se-
quenced and is different for different lessons .
Units developed by the two teachers who did their own planning con-
cerned' American Indians, Eskimos, transportation, and city living . These
units had been developed in their college courses, seven to ten years earlier .
Changes were made as teachers acquired new materials or as ideas they
had relied on in the past did not seem to work well in practice, usually due
to the answer to one of the above questions regarding textbook-related
activities .
Many teachers reported they reflected about their classes,and thought
of activities almost continuously at odd moments during their days . While
shopping for groceries, driving to school, watching television, or painting
the living room, one part of their minds might have been considering
How can I help George and Susan understand what a state is? They
don't even understand what a map is, let alone the notion of a state .
And Lawrence passed his spelling test, but on his social studies paper,
he spelled "country" wrong even though it was one of his spelling
words. What can I do? I wonder whether the reports the children are
writing will be as good as last year's . I have to remember to fill out
the request for a field trip form .
At another odd moment, one teacher wondered how to relate social studies
to the arts, because that teacher taught both subjects and wanted to inte-
grate the two . Whatever the setting, part of the teacher's mind reflected on
the past and planned for the future, envisioning a lesson . Perhaps this is one
reason why teachers say they take school home with them and envy people
in other vocations. When teachers "take school home," it is because they
reflect about what happened today and consider tomorrow .
Mental planning, then, is a reflection on the past and a consideration of
what might work for a lesson; frequently teachers envision that lesson as
part of their planning . It occurs throughout the day and ideas are consid-
ered almost simultaneously and in various orders . Teachers may consider
mental~~planning to be subconscious, partly because educational theorists
have not recognized it as a form of planning . When these twelve teachers
learned about planning in preservice education courses, they reported, les-
son planning was usually discussed as the plan written in the planbook ; the
thought process leading up to the writing of the plan was not addressed .
Most teachers wrote their plans as Mozart wrote his musical works-the
plan was fully conceived mentally before being written . However, when en-
acting those plans, many teachers frequently altered them for various rea-
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sons, such as changes in the schedule, the teacher's recognition that back-
ground material was necessary for the children to understand a concept, or
the discussion of one topic would trigger thoughts about another .
What functions did mental planning serve? In several teachers' views,
mentally rehearsing a lesson permitted them to alter a plan in their minds if
they foresaw problems . Mental rehearsal may also have provided psycho-
logical support by reassuring teachers that the lesson would run smoothly,
leading to a feeling of comfort and that teachers could control the situation .
One teacher considered mental planning as a time to fill in the details and
decide upon alternative strategies should her selected strategy fail . Teachers
said of mental planning :
I think about what might go wrong so I can shortcircuit it before it
happens .
I think about other things I might do if my plan doesn't work . That
way, I have other possibilities to work with if the plan goes wrong
when I'm teaching . It's hard to just plan on your feet-this way, I
have some options. I can also fill in all the little nooks and crannies in
my plan before I'm standing up there in front of 26 children .
Whether it helps things go smoothly, I'm not sure . But I do know it
makes me feel better to have thought about it .
Influences on Teachers' Plans
When teachers implemented a program-be it a textbook series, a kit,
or a unit-several factors appeared to influence that implementation . These
are 1 . teachers' skills and knowledge, 2 . teachers' attitudes and beliefs, and
3. teachers' perceptions of features within the setting . Clearly, the three
factors influence one another and are not neatly separable .
Teachers' Skills and Knowledge . Teachers involved in our study tended to
plan lessons about subjects they knew and enjoyed rather than those sub-
jects they knew less or disliked, unless a particular topic had been man-
dated. For example, the two who had developed their own units and had
taught them for seven to ten years had done so partly because the topics
were interesting to them . And, several teachers who enjoyed teaching art
felt uncomfortable with it because certain activities were messy and they
did not believe they were artists themselves . As one teacher noted,
I can teach children how to make things, but not about true art . I'm
just not creative. I don't know how to draw and I don't know how art-
ists work .
Her lessons were primarily pattern art, where children were to make some-
thing to look like hers did . She said of social studies :
Well, I feel more comfortable with that . I have a series to use . I really
only had three courses in what you'd call social studies in college, and
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I don't think I really understand it fully . But I can imagine ways to
make it more exciting, like projects and going on field trips . I like so-
cial studies because we can do a lot of things, but we only have two
half-hour periods a week for it on Tuesday and Friday after lunch . I
can't have very exciting projects or in-depth discussions in just half an
hour .
Whether teachers feel at home in a discipline is important, for it affects
whether they feel comfortable teaching that discipline and whether they
represent or misrender concepts within it . The problem is particularly sali-
ent when we consider elementary schools, where teachers are responsible
for seven or eight subjects a week. In elementary schools, teachers are ex-
pected to be "Renaissance people" and to know enough about each disci-
pline to teach it well . Yet, it is virtually impossible to expect this . As one
teacher lamented,
I 'know so little about science it's ridiculous . I go through the motions,
using the book . All I can hope is that next year, my kids will have [a
certain teacher], because she loves science and knows a lot about it .
This is probably true of social studies as well, and may be one factor con-
tributing to reliance on texts by many teachers .
Other examples of skills and knowledge affecting the social studies con-
cern diverse ways of instructing children . Managing groupwork, overseeing
projects and asking varied sorts of questions may or may not be in a partic-
ular teacher's repertoire of skills ; and, such kinds of teacher behavior may
be necessary to the social studies program adopted by a school system. This
may cause teachers to modify suggestions in a manual and thereby alter the
nature of the program in rather substantial ways . For instance, what was
intended to be a process-oriented curriculum may become fact-oriented if
teachers do not have the skills and knowledge necessary to implement the
former approach . And a discussion designed by the program developers to
focus upon issues may be transformed. to focus upon facts if a teacher feels
uncomfortable in handling such a discussion .
Another difficulty cited by two of the teachers and agreed upon by
many was the lack of coursework-preservice or inservice-about planning .
Teachers reported the following :
II had one course where unit planning was mentioned, and we each
wrote one unit, but there wasn't any formal lecture or reading about
planning a unit .
We learned about lesson planning-you know, writing objectives, ma-
terials concepts and so on-in two of my classes in undergraduate
school .
This lack of having studied planning may have contributed to the dis-
jointed, patchwork nature of the curriculum seen in ten of the twelve class-
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rooms observed, where a thread of continuity from day to day was missing .
For example, these lessons followed one another consecutively in a fifth-
grade social studies class :
Monday: a film about the fishing industry followed by a dis-
cussion of why people along coasts fish and how it in-
fluences the economy.
Wednesday: a lesson in mapreading about longitude and latitude,
demonstrated on a map in front of the room followed
by a ditto regarding locating cities by degrees of lon-
gitude and latitude.
Monday: taking turns, reading aloud a section of the text deal-
ing with the lumber industry .
While the three lessons could have been related, the teacher did not do so .
For ten of the twelve teachers, the criterion of continuity of lessons did not
appear to enter into their planning .
Also apparent in teachers' reports was the problem that in teacher edu-
cation courses planning was conceived of as what is written on paper, rather
than as including mental planning . Mental planning has the potential for
being one of the most professional activities of teaching for, during mental
planning, teachers can relate theory and research to the particulars they
face and they can analyze what transpires in their classrooms . Perhaps be-
cause mental planning is not discussed in teacher education, this is one rea-
son why we did not find teachers relating research and theory (such as the
need for continuity) to the particulars of their situations . Continuity and
integration entered only two of twelve teachers' planning as a daily concern .
A final example of the knowledge and skills of teachers relates to errors
in textbooks. Teachers in our study believed they could trust textbooks, for
they believed they had been written by experts. They tended to distrust
themselves if they encountered a difficulty in the text rather than dis-
trusting the text. For example, a second grade teacher had just taught chil-
dren that in single-syllable words ending in e, the preceding vowel is usually
long. Children read words such as "rose," "came," "hope," and "shape ."
Unfortunately, the name of the main character in that day's story was
"Jose." This teacher noted how confusing this must be to children and be-
lieved many other names could have been employed, even names we charac-
teristically associate with ethnic minorities .
Teachers also assumed textbooks incorporated in them some sort of con-
tinuity from one story, chapter, or skill to the next . This assumption may be
unwarranted, for as Bowler (1978, p . 39) says, "textbooks are better de-
scribed as assembled than as written" (emphases in original) . The assump-
tion regarding continuity could be explored through textbook analysis .
Teachers' belief that continuity was present in texts and apparent to chil-
dren may also have contributed to the disjointed nature of the curriculum
described above .
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Teachers' skills and knowledge, then, influenced the nature of planning
and topics to be addressed . Plans frequently transformed a program's inten-
tions into a lesson the teacher felt more able to engineer in a classroom
than the plan suggested in a manual accompanying a program .
Teachers' Attitudes and Beliefs. Teachers' conceptions of problems such as
the proper role for the teacher, how children's interests are to be incorpo-
rated into a lesson, what is basic for children to learn, and what constitutes
an ideal learning environment also affected what teachers planned to do in
a classroom. It appears that many of these attitudes and beliefs are influ-
enced by teachers' perceptions of what administrators and colleagues
believe .i
For example, one teacher said,
I think we have to think about how children get interested in some-
thing when we plan . Just because it's in the book and some adult
thought it was important doesn't mean kids will be naturally interested
irk it .
Clearly, she believed children's interest was a necessary condition if learn-
ing ware to occur. This teacher was one of the two who also tried to facili-
tate children's integrating ideas from various lessons . One day, for example,
during reading she said
Remember last week when we studied mapreading in social studies?
This story is about Magellan, and after you read it, we'll put his voy-
ages on the project globe . Facts of his voyages are in the story .
In her view, this introduction to the story permitted children to relate one
lesson to another and may have created interest in it, for she had noted that
most children were excited and successful in the mapreading activities .
Another teacher who had studied unit planning in her education courses
developed a unit about Indians for her third graders . Taught in six weeks,
in three half-hour sessions per week, the unit glossed over the cultures of
different groups of American Indians, and may have led children to believe
that Indians live in wigwams, teepees, pueblos and long houses, hunt and
gather food, and wear beads and deerskins, for it incorporated readings and
activities oriented toward those facts rather than toward issues or concepts .
However, she taught about Indians because she believed third graders were
naturally interested in them because of Western films .
Teachers' Perceptions of the Context . When we consider influences of the
context upon what teachers plan and do in classrooms, we can conceive of
these influences as having two sources : the formal (written) policies of the
school, and other events in the school that lead teachers to understand its
covert policies. Formal policies are issued in school manuals, on memo-
randa, and in teachers' meeting . Teachers come to understand a school's
covert policies by interpreting other teachers' behavior and the principal's
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behavior, and through these the teacher forms a notion of what is expected
or acceptable in that setting . For example, when a principal's remarks
about the noise level, the informal seating arrangement in a classroom, or
what appears on a bulletin board, a teacher has an opportunity to under-
stand whether what the principal saw was acceptable. Practice may be
modified for the principal's next visit . Comments and actions by colleagues
similarly affect teachers' practice . Formal and covert policies can be viewed
as establishing the limits within which teachers are able to plan in a partic-
ular setting . These may support options, or they may constrain the options
available to the teacher, and may be in harmony or in conflict with a par-
ticular teacher's beliefs. Indeed, this influence of the setting may be one
factor affecting whether a teacher is able to implement personal beliefs
about the proper nature of schooling .
Formal Policies
Scheduling . In five of six elementary schools involved in this study the
principal developed a central schedule to permit children to be grouped ac-
cording to levels (usually for reading and mathematics), and to permit
departmentalization . This schedule followed the state-mandated guidelines
for time allocations and affected the curriculum in several ways . For one,
teachers felt constrained to stay with the schedule ; whether they finished a
lesson early, or had just gotten into an exciting discussion, children had to
be dismissed on time because other teachers were dependent on punctual
dismissal. As one teacher remarked,
Ability grouping tends to focus us more on the subject matter than on
the children, which isn't natural to most elementary school teachers .
Also, it makes me adhere to the time schedule. It's very rigid . If a les-
son is going very well, my normal inclination would be to continue it,
but when we change classes I can't do that .
Secondly, this schedule reinforced a curriculum organized by a collec-
tion code (Bernstein, 1971) of academic subjects in all schools observed as
part of this study. That is, the curriculum was a collection of discrete sub-
jects, and this separation was reinforced by naming the subjects as subjects
on the schedule and allocating to each a particular time slot . In some
schools, teachers became subject matter experts as children changed classes
to meet their ability groups in reading and mathematics and to meet the so-
cial studies, science, music, physical education or art teacher . This limited
the opportunity for teachers to integrate subject matter, for not only were
the schools departmentalized, but teachers were also isolated from col-
leagues. They did not discuss what happened in their classrooms, with the
result that one teacher did not know what others did . What one teacher did
might have conflicted with what transpired in other classrooms ; it might
have been redundant ; and it certainly was not overtly connected to what
happened elsewhere . Any connections among lessons were made by chance
and left up to individual students . Opportunities for such connections ex-
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isted, but they were not facilitated or explored by teachers and children, for
the teachers were as isolated from each other as the subject matter was .
The centrally-devised schedule set aside a specific amount of time for
each subject . On the average, language arts was allocated 105 minutes
daily, mathematics 45 minutes, and recess one half hour . Other subjects
were not taught daily. Social studies was allocated 60 to 90 minutes a week,
usually in two or three time blocks spread over several days . Lower grades
(K-3) devoted less time to social studies and more to language arts than
did upper grades (4-6) . Because social studies was usually taught every
other day, or every third day, lessons may have seemed bounded, isolated
from preceding and subsequent lessons by intervening time . Additionally,
with only 30 to 45 minutes in a class period, certain activities were imprac-
tical because they were too time-consuming . When only 90 minutes was al-
located a week, there seemed no good options for teachers ; with three 30
minute periods, the nature of an activity was constrained but social studies
happened more frequently; but, with two 45 minute periods, classes were
more spread out over the week, although a greater variety of activities was
possible. Flexible scheduling was not considered by the principals of schools
involved in this study . That is, if time were thought of by the month or six-
week period rather than by the week, teachers might have been able to have
had social studies or science daily, or for a longer duration, and perhaps
have achieved a sense of continuity, depth and intensity .
The daily schedule, then, affected planning in several ways. It held
teachers to the schedule, since most schools were departmentalized ; it sup-
ported a curriculum organized by a collection code of academic disciplines,
which discouraged integration . The schedule also allocated little time
weekly to social studies, resulting in scattered lessons of short duration,
which influenced the nature of what teachers could plan .
Textbook use . In one of the three school systems studied, texts formed the
basis of the curriculum by administrative edict . A principal's memorandum
read :
Teachers are reminded that only materials found in the adopted text-
books can be duplicated. Supplementary materials are not to be sten-
ciled and duplicated . It is the feeling of the administration that materi-
als in the textbooks are adequate and must be completed before other
materials are to be introduced in the curriculum .
Teachers in all three systems generally relied on textbooks as the basis for
their plans, whether as a result of formal or covert policies; for not only
were memoranda circulated, but also, few other materials were available .
Texts provided a sense of security about what to teach, and policies rein-
forced their use. The promotion. policy in one school system related to the
use of textbooks . It read, in part,
To successfully complete a course, students must meet the following
criteria : Math, Science, Health-Grades 5, 6, and 7-must master
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75 % of the established program ; Social Studies-Grades 5, 6, and 7-
must master 50 % of the established program .
Because the "established program" was the textbook, teachers who did not
want to be faced with retaining students may have followed texts more
closely in an attempt to prevent failure . We might also wonder in regard to
this policy why students were to master 75 % of certain subjects, but only
50 % of social studies . Surely the policy reflects the priorities of the school
system .
In all school systems that were a part of this study, then, social studies
was derived almost exclusively from the textbook. In one school, teachers
apparently felt they were able to adapt the text, for children went on field
trips, wrote reports related to topics from certain chapters, and studied
units devised by teachers . Several teachers voiced concern that the textbook
they were required to use was above the reading level of many students . As
one sixth grade teacher said,
I didn't use the textbook since it is about three reading levels above my
students . I used maps, films, filmstrips, written and oral reports, and
resource persons in my own units .
Another believed the book was dated :
Our system seems to have money for new math and reading books, but
none for social studies . We have some old, beat-up Ginn books, but I
teach units about transportation and Indians I developed instead .
These two experienced teachers had also studied unit planning in college
courses. Their units were not challenged by anyone, and a stereotypic, su-
perficial view of Indians, Eskimos, and life in cities may have been
presented to children through these units .
Because social studies was allocated little time, teachers were forced to
pick and choose among activities and chapters in the adopted series or in
their units . Social studies may also have suffered in that integration with
other subjects was virtually impossible because the curriculum was organ-
ized through a collection code of academic subjects rather than organized
as an integrated code which might have encouraged children to see relation-
ships among subjects. Isolation of teachers from one another may have
compounded the problem of isolation of subjects and the lack of critical re-
view of units and plans may have permitted teachers to present distorted,
superficial pictures of the way of life of certain groups of people .
Other policies such as those governing the storage and use of materials,
field trips, use of films, class size, promotion and retention, and grading
may also have influenced what teachers perceived they were able to plan
for social studies lessons (see McCutcheon, 1980) .
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Covert policies .
Covert policies also affect what teachers believe is permitted in a particular
school. Teachers learn covert, unwritten policies as they observe and listen
to their colleagues and administrators, for words and actions transmit to
others what is permissible in a particular school .
Interruptions . In the twelve classrooms, many events interrupted the flow
of what occurred each day . Approximately one-third of these interruptions
was externally caused, such as an intercom announcement regarding sum-
mer school, a note for teachers to sign regarding the theft of a pair of gym
shoes from a locker, or a request for the numbers of children whose parents
planned to attend a meeting . Unpredictable events, such as changes in the
time for an assembly, also interrupted the daily fare, yet teachers were ex-
pected to deal with them promptly . One teacher believed her principal was
more concerned with the orderly running of the school than with whether
any education occurred .
What influences did these interruptions have on teachers' planning?
Teachers reported :
Well, I can't plan for them. But I know they'll happen sometime every
day. They cause me to have to reteach a great deal .
I just get going, when I'm interrupted, and then everyone loses track of
what's going on. So I have to start over . It wastes a great deal of
time.
It's also frustrating . Sometime I have so many interruptions in a row
that I just say "Forget it" and change my lesson to something easier
for me to cope with . But I know I'll have to fit that other lesson in
sometime .
Sometimes, I lose so much time from them that I have to reschedule
several lessons .
Continuity was broken, extra time consumed as teachers answered the in-
tercom and had to reteach parts of lessons or remind the children and
themselves of what was happening before the interruption . Some lessons
were rescheduled, and these were often in subjects other than language arts
and mathematics, in this era of the "basics ." Teachers wondered if inter-
ruptions might be controlled more by principals so they would occur only
during certain portions of the day . As one teacher said,
The. intercom is all too convenient. He can just flip it on whenever
something strikes him that I need to know about, in his opinion .
Another teacher wondered,
With so many interruptions, it makes me wonder what's important
around here . Is learning important? If so, we shouldn't be interrupted
so much .
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Perhaps interruptions reinforce teachers' seeing their task as getting
through the day, for they seem to dilute somewhat the activities in which
teachers and children engage.
Discipline . Most teachers believe control was a major factor principals con-
sidered when evaluating teachers . As one teacher commented,
If my principal sees the children out of their seats and on the floor, he
automatically thinks they aren't learning anything . And they're out of
control . So we can only do certain things in my room if he's stalking
the halls. Unless I want a major confrontation . And I can't afford
that-I don't have tenure, and I don't think he would think much of
my arguments about why I think kids can learn things doing projects
on the floor . He just wants me to follow orders, and he wants things
under control .
Another teacher agreed, continuing,
She also doesn't like it if kids don't raise their hands to answer . Some-
times in a discussion, my kids don't raise their hands ; they just wait for
a natural break and say what they wanted to say .
A principal's views on discipline, combined with the threat of a negative
evaluation, then, may cause teachers to plan certain activities rather than
others that may lead to behavior the principal would not accept.
This fear of the principal also prevented teachers from confessing their
weaknesses in order to receive assistance with a weakness . One teacher felt
uncomfortable with new math . As she said,
Even though the newest books aren't as steeped in new math as they
once were, those concepts underlie it all . How can I teach what I my-
self don't understand?
Teachers saw this as problematic because they had no one to ask for assist-
ance, particularly in this era of teacher surplus .
One teacher disagreed . She believed her principal was supportive of
growth and related that
I told him I didn't know anything about art, and here I'm supposed to
teach it to all the fifth graders! So he arranged for me to assist [the
art teacher] on the days she visits the school. [The principal] teaches
my classes while I do that .
Surely, other factors within the setting influence teacher planning as well .
The examples provided here illustrate the nature of certain influences on
what teachers plan, and are not intended to provide an exhaustive list
(see McCutcheon, 1980, for others) .
Implications
For Theorists . This study has revealed teacher planning as having several
features similar to those discussed by certain curriculum theorists, such as
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William A. Reid (1978) and Joseph Schwab (1969) . For one thing, the
study demonstrates that planning is a practical activity of teachers dealing
with situationally-specific, practical problems . In Reid's view (1978), "cur-
riculum theories are theories about how to solve curriculum problems" (p .
41). He elaborates upon this by characterizing curriculum problems as
practical ones, (1) consisting of questions that have to be answered, (2)
having uncertain grounds on which decisions are to be made, (3) necessi-
tating taking into account an existing state of affairs, (4) being in some
ways unique from problem to problem, (5) compelling us to balance com-
peting goals and values, (6) being uncertain as to outcome and (7) di-
recting our thoughts toward forecasting what action might result in a desir-
able state of affairs (Reid, 1978) .
Some curriculum theorists would argue that curriculum problems
merely call upon us to use a prescribed structure to solve them . Ralph
Tyler, James Popham and others have argued that following an objectives-
first procedure will lead to a solution of the problem . As this study has
demonstrated, these teachers did not generally follow an objectives-first
procedure, although they could reiterate the steps to be followed if one were
to use such a procedure .
It seems possible that theory is appropriate to discuss in several ways as
related to solving practical problems. For one, descriptive and critical stud-
ies could be undertaken where the focus was upon characterizing how prac-
tical problems are solved . These eventually may yield a richer theory than
we now have of practical problem solving, and such a theory would be
based upon empirical work rather than solely upon conceptual work . Sec-
ondly, people's personal theories about what is important to teach in social
studies and how one should teach it could be examined . Within the frame-
work of planning as a practical activity, such personal theory probably sup-
ports teachers as they form the conceptual grounds upon which to make de-
cisions among competing goals and values and the personal theory provides
a vision of what constitutes a desirable state of affairs . Additionally, what
people recognize as the existing state of affairs might be studied, for it sets
the boundaries around what decisions might be made . In this study, for ex-
ample, teachers perceived constraints arising out of what others in the
building said to them and policies of the school . Studies about the nature of
decision making, the grounds for decisions, and the context in which they
are made through the perception of the decision maker might help us de-
velop theories regarding the process (rather than the procedure) of decision
making as a practical activity necessary to teaching .
Curriculum theories could be developed and research done about them,
then, in relation to decision making as a practical, necessary aspect of
teaching . This study has documented some of the nature of planning as a
practical activity-that is, situation-specific, necessitating action, taking
into account a host of features about students, supplies, time, and feasibil-
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ity. More studies are needed, though, if we are to understand this complex
phenomenon .
For Teacher Education. One implication of this study is that we need to
broaden the view of planning presented to teachers . These teachers appar-
ently viewed planning as a practical activity, and, not surprisingly, they
dealt with practical considerations . Logistical issues, such as materials,
time, expertise necessary to deal with particular content or the development
of particular skills, and instructional methods were contemplated . Teacher
educators, it seems, could enrich mental planning by stressing concepts
such as continuity, integration, and the appropriateness of topics and skills
for certain age groups. A critically reflective approach to planning could
also be developed by helping teachers learn to examine unit plans and text-
books regarding issues such as stereotyping, the relative merit of lessons,
continuity and integration of ideas. Case studies about teachers implement-
ing a program could be discussed through this critically reflective approach,
and issues related to one's own practice could be addressed. Prospective and
practicing teachers could also explore the merit of finding a colleague with
whom to examine practice, materials and plans . Since textbooks appeared
to be the basis for the curriculum in many school systems, teacher educa-
tors could also help their students conceive of ways to evaluate and adapt
text materials for effective use . Social studies teacher educators could also
help prospective and practicing teachers consider "what is social studies?"
With a clear notion of the sorts of concerns addressed in social studies,
teachers may be enabled to choose topics from texts and devise their own
materials carefully, with a clear vision of the concepts and skills that could
comprise the thread of continuity weaving through the course. Social stud-
ies, as taught in many colleges and universities, is fragmented into special-
ized topics such as economics, political science, history, sociology, and an-
thropology . Time is not set aside for students to synthesize the fragments
into a general picture concerning the social studies . What light can each
shed on various topics? What could an economist, socioloist, a political sci-
entist and a historian tell us about the Depression? Such a view is necessary
if teachers are to understand what is important to teach, to decide which
textbook is best, and other matters regarding planning .
Primarily, then, implications for teacher educators are to enrich mental
planning by helping teachers develop a larger set of questions than they
normally have when they plan . These questions relate to educational mat-
ters (How can I help children see connections between yesterday's and to-
day's lessons? between social studies and language arts? How does this ac-
tivity relate to an overall view of what constitutes the social studies?) . Such
questions may enrich the planning, for this study revealed that these teach-
ers were more likely to consider logistical matters than educational ones .
Secondly, a more critically reflective posture about text materials and
unit plans may be facilitated by helping teachers understand the value of a
trusted colleague's opinions . The trusted colleague may function as an out-
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sider, to a certain extent, able to see strengths and problems the insider-
teacher is unable to see by virtue of being too immersed in the day-to-day
events to be able to have perspective enough to see certain aspects of those
events .
Social studies, in this era of back-to-the-basics, appeared to be faring
poorly in elementary schools that were a part of this study . Classes met for
60 to 90 minutes weekly, were scattered through the week, and were among
the first subjects to be dropped from the curriculum for an assembly or an-
other special event . Only 50 % of the social studies program had to be com-
pleted in one school system, 25 % less than for most other subjects .
Whatever that means, it implies that language arts, mathematics and other
subjects have a higher priority than social studies in that school system .
Responding to public pressure, schools work to raise test scores in reading
and mathematics to the neglect of many other subjects . -Ielping parents,
legislators and other policy makers see the contributions the social studies
can make to life-individual and social life-is clearly an important task
for educators at all levels who are interested in the social studies . It seems
no easy task, and one to be addressed not only by teacher educators, but
also by people in schools .
For Schools . Eliminating the sense of isolation of teachers and subject mat-
ter appears to be another implication of this research . Integration among
disciplines, the exchange of ideas and deliberation about them cannot occur
without some organizational changes in schools. The curriculum of many
elementary schools may be organized as it was in these twelve schools-as
a collection of separate disciplines, frequently taught by separate teachers.
The textbook industry (by publishing different texts for each subject), the
organization of report cards and schedules by discrete subjects, and the sep-
aration of methods courses in teacher education into distinct disciplines are
a few factors which maintain and reproduce such a curriculum organization
in schools. Changes may be needed in curriculum organization if we are to
help children make connections among subjects . What are alternatives, if
faculties desired a change?
The curriculum organization necessitating the least conceptual and ad-
ministrative change is the correlation of several disciplines, such as litera-
ture and social studies . In this case, the literature of a particular period,
group of people, or locale could be read in conjunction with social studies
topics. A single teacher could correlate the two subjects, or a team of
teachers could plan them and teach them . Other sorts of correlation are
also possible .
Necessitating more change is the core curriculum organization . This is
less subject-matter focused, and as a result may be more difficult to imple-
ment, for materials would have to be restructured and developed, and a dif-
ferent view of the way to arrange school time would have to be adopted .
Traditional frames around subject matter are absent in a core curriculum
63
organization; rather, broad topics are addressed and, by applying concepts
and skills from a variety of disciplines, the topic is explored (see Tanner
and Tanner, 1980) . For example, questions about pollution, or whether we
should save the whales, or whether we should use nuclear energy could be
approached through reading science fiction, making field trips, viewing
films, discussing the issue with experts, writing articles, and collecting rele-
vant newspaper reports . The pollution question could also be examined by
taking air and water samples and studying the effects of particular residues
on plant and animal life. Thus, children could inquire into a matter and use
knowledge and methods of various disciplines when they are appropriate for
understanding a problem. A core curriculum organization could be insti-
tuted for part of the day, if educators felt certain fundamental subjects
were being neglected . Topics from the social studies appear to be relevant
especially in organizing a core curriculum because skills, information and
concepts from a variety of disciplines might be pertinent to such topics .
A second implication of this study is the need for less isolation of teach-
ers. Isolated and without the spirit of critical examination of the problems
they face, teachers cannot help one another in planning, in dealing with
practical problems, or with voids in their skills and knowledge . Isolated,
they do not know what transpired in previous years and what is to come for
the children they teach as they advance to higher grades, nor what occurs
to children with other teachers they meet through the week. As a group,
teachers may be able to draw upon one another's strengths and collaborate
to address common issues, such as interruptions . They could collegially cri-
tique one another's plans, textbooks and policies that interfere with the cur-
riculum and consider ways to help more children have greater access to the
curriculum than is presently the case .
Summary
Teachers' planning, then, involves a complex, simultaneous juggling of
many questions and information about past practice, subject matter, chil-
dren, and materials . Planning does not follow the objectives-first model
taught in many education courses . Rather, it accounts for far more infor-
mation, follows different patterns, and is more complex than the objec-
tives-first model . It is a practical activity of teachers and, as a result,
practical considerations are weighed . Most lessons are at least partly de-
rived from textbooks .
The sequence of lessons in social studies is disjointed in many class-
rooms. A lack of continuity may be due to an assumption that textbook au-
thors provide continuity, an assumption that may or may not be warranted .
The lack of continuity may also arise out of scheduling social studies every
other day, interruptions, teachers' lack of concern for continuity, and the
lack of a view of what constitutes social studies . Social studies lessons in
elementary schools are usually scheduled two or three 30 to 45 minute peri-
ods a week . As a result of the short amount of time allocated to social stud-
64
ies, only activities of short duration could be planned . This may have influ-
enced the sorts of learning children had access to in social studies .
Teachers' skills and knowledge, attitudes and beliefs, and their percep-
tions of what is permitted in their setting influence what they plan . This
study has revealed that teachers' planning is a highly practical, complex ac-
tivity related to teaching . Planning is' influenced in many ways, in turn in-
fluencing what children have an opportunity to learn. The question re-
mains, how can we incorporate this notion of how teachers naturally plan
into our theories, yet enrich it to facilitate better schooling for all involved?
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This is the second of two articles dealing with the reconstructionist
rationale for social education . The first article provided an analysis of
reconstructionism as expressed in the works of George Counts and
Theodore Brameld (Stanley, 1981) . These two authors developed a
rationale for social education which differed significantly from those of
their contemporaries who were often labeled as reconstructionists . The
Counts-Brameld rationale will hereafter be referred to as radical
reconstructionism .
The first article explained the basic tenets of radical reconstructionism
and outlined the radical reconstructionist rationale for social education .
This article has two basic objectives. First, it examines the extent to which
the tenets of radical reconstructionism are reflected in five dominant
rationales for modern social education . Second, the basic tenets of radical
reconstruction are used as criteria to analyze the adequacy of the five
modern rationales .
There are important reasons for examining these issues . Considerable
debate still exists over how to rationalize and define social education . The
importance of this conceptual debate should not be underestimated, for it
raises specific questions which shape the development of theory and
practice in the field . Several recent attempts have been made to define and
rationalize social education, but none has given serious attention to the
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radical reconstructionist rationale (Engle, 1968; Barth and Shermis, 1970 ;
Brubaker, et al. 1977; and Barr et al . 1977) .
The position taken here is that radical reconstructionism is a significant
movement in the history of social education, and that the radical
reconstructionists have raised questions and made proposals which could
enrich and expand the debate over how to define and rationalize the field .
The tenets of radical reconstructionism also provide a prism to examine
how modern social educators deal with several important issues raised by
radical critics . A summary of the radical reconstructionist position is in
order before proceeding .
The radical reconstructionists were a small faction on the left of the
progressive education movement . Their ideas crystalized during the
depression decade, and Brameld has revised and expanded the rationale
since 1945 .
Counts and Brameld believed that our culture was in a state of crisis,
and they feared that attempts to resolve it could lead to the creation of a
totalitarian political system. But the crisis they attempted to define went
beyond the obvious economic collapse which gripped the nation in the
1930's. They also perceived a crisis in values which manifested ifself in
various cultural bifurcations and value conflicts . Among the most
significant value conflicts was the antagonism between laissez-faire
individualism and the perceived need for social consensus and collectivism .
Such conflicts could be observed in numerous facets of our culture, and
resulted in confusion, moral relativism, and a loss of social purpose .
The radical reconstructionists also believed that many of our social
institutions had ceased to function in the interest of the vast majority of
people. Instead, they were now dominated by and functioned in the interest
of certain powerful groups. The radical reconstructionists contended that
most people were unaware of this situation, because the negative aspects of
our major institutions were masked by an outmoded ideology which
rationalized their present functions .
The radical reconstructionist vision of the "good society" included a
higher degree of planning and control over our major economic institutions .
Natural resources would be distributed and used in the public interest, but
this would not require public ownership of the means of production . They
also rejected any notions of a proletarian dictatorship, and insisted on the
preservation of democratic freedoms .
Counts and Brameld believed that a selfish and narrow view of
individualism was undermining our democratic values and sense of
community. When they spoke of cultural transformation, they were calling
for the creation of a new philosophy and value system to serve as a guide
for cultural and social criticism. In their view, a radical transformation of
consciousness was a prerequisite for the structural transformation of the
68
culture and society . They hoped for the creation of a new system which
would protect democratic freedoms, guarantee public participation in the
political process and ensure economic justice .
Social education was to play a key role in the process of cultural
transformation . Admittedly, the impact of culture is strong and the process
of cultural and social change complex . Still, the radical reconstructionists
were optimistic regarding our ability to make such changes . Social
educators, they believed, were in a unique position to influence the thinking
of millions of young people directly and at a critical point in their social
development . Thus, they should be directly involved in the process of
improving our culture and institutions.
First, they urged social educators to develop a theory of social welfare
based on the radical reconstructionist philosophy . This would serve as a
guide to curriculum design and classroom practice . They reasoned that
without a vision of a preferred future, social educators would lack standards
for committing themselves to rational, normative goals for the present .
Second, social educators should incorporate social criticism or critical
theory into their program . In this way, social education could function to
monitor the extent of cultural lag, and to help expose the dysfunctional
aspects of our culture and institutions . This would be in contrast to the
present tendency of social educators to transmit and rationalize the status
quo .
Third, the radical reconstructionists believed that indoctrination was
inevitable in any social education program . They defined indoctrination as
the attempt to persuade others of the truth of certain propositions or
hypotheses . In our society, school attendance is compulsory and many
social studies courses are required . These conditions, they reasoned, reflect
certain value preferences and exclude a number of alternatives . In addition,
social studies teachers select specific course content and teaching strategies
while ignoring or deemphasizing other content and strategies . Thus students
are constantly exposed to a contrived and filtered environment in any social
education class . While the radical reconstructionists endorsed reflective
inquiry and opposed any attempt to distort or suppress information, they
insisted that there was no way to carry on the process of filtering and
selecting without some value criteria. Consequently, it made no sense to
hold that social education should be neutral or nonpartisan .
Thus, unlike Dewey and his intellectual progeny, the radical
reconstructionists favored designing a social education program based on
normative commitments or "defensible partialities ." These commitments
would provide a guide for content selection and classroom practice . They
agreed that all knowledge must be regarded as tentative, but this is not a
sufficient reason to avoid making normative commitments of an indefinite
nature .
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No culture is completely static, and no doubt our culture is constantly
being changed in a variety of ways, many of which we are unaware . The
radical reconstructionists realized this but they were concerned that such
change was largely accidental, unplanned and unexamined . Thus it might
have negative effects or be irrelevant to the changes they considered
important. If by chance social education or some aspect of the "hidden
curriculum" caused such effects, it did not constitute an adequate
educational program . In addition, if social educators really were
functioning to transmit the status quo uncritically, they were teaching
students that both social criticism and radical change were undesirable or
at best unimportant . The radical reconstructionists argued that an ongoing
process of social criticism was the only adequate way to assess the need for
cultural and social change. They urged that, as far as possible, we should
seek to influence the course of change along lines consistent with their view
of the "good society ."
One may reject the radical reconstructionists' vision of the "good
society" and still see much of relevance in their argument . If, as many
suggest (Barr, Barth & Shermis, 1977), social educators are primarily
concerned with citizenship, such training must consist of more than the
uncritical transmission of the culture. It is also reasonable to argue that
social educators must develop rationales which are sensitive to the problems
connected with indoctrination . In addition, if social educators are
attempting to deal with students who will live and work in the future, one
may assume that they should have a vision of what a preferred future
might be like . Such a vision requires a critical analysis of the present
culture because we must try to know to what extent it should serve as a
model for the future .
In sum then, the radical reconstructionists urged social educators to
address the following concerns in the process of training citizens : 1) the
need to develop a theory of social welfare and to make normative
commitments to a vision of the "good society" ; 2) the importance of social
criticism to help expose the dysfunctional aspects of our culture and
institutions ; 3) the need to consider radical proposals for cultural and
institutional change; and 4) the inevitability of indoctrination and the need
to develop a process for using it as a tool for rationally implementing social
and cultural change . These concerns or tenets are used here as criteria for
the critical analysis of five significant rationales for modern social
education. The modern rationales are examined to determine to what extent
they adequately reflect and deal with the concerns of radical
reconstructionism .
The rationale categories used here are similar to those used by others
(Barth & Shermis, 1970), and no claim is made that they are definitive or
exclusive. Rather, they are used to organize and facilitate the analysis of
current social education . Still, each rationale can be logically defended in
terms of its focus and concerns. The five categories used here include
70
rationales based on : 1) common or core values; 2) the social science
disciplines and history ; 3) the inquiry process and decision-making ; 4)
reflective inquiry into social problems ; and 5) citizen action. In most
instances, only one or a few examples of each rationale will be examined as
representative of the category .
It is recognized that actual classroom practice might frequently conflict
with the rationales advocated by modern social educators . This could be a
serious problem, but it is not the concern of this paper . The attempt here is
to examine critically various rationales and the effects they might have
should they be implemented . The consequences of failing to practice these
rationales must be examined elsewhere .
Social Education Based on Common Values
The Jurisprudential rationale developed by Oliver and Shaver (1966) is
an excellent example of an approach based on common values, in this case
political and legal values. Oliver and Shaver believe that the selection of so-
cial studies content should be guided by the interests of the community and
the students residing therein (pp . 7-8) . They also conclude that the pri-
mary goal of the social studies should be to "promote the dignity and worth
of each individual" (p. 9). They accept this as a fundamental commitment
yet they claim that it cannot be justified in any "ultimate sense" (p . 9) .
The most persuasive reasons for adopting these values seem to be cul-
turebound, and they conclude that the commitment to human dignity is an
example of the "belief in man as an end in himself" (p.10) .
But these basic values are vague and subject to interpretation . America
is a society of numerous subcultures and each could have its own recom-
mendation for achieving the dignity and worth of the individual . Oliver and
Shaver contend that this is an important reason for maintaining the option
to choose freely among alternative solutions to problems (p . 10) . But, a na-
tional society would not be possible without general ethical standards about
which the various subcultures can agree (p . 11) . Such standards can be de-
rived from the great political documents of our past and constitute what
Gunnar Myrdal called the "American Creed" (pp . 11-12) . These include
the basic rights and freedoms outlined in the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution . The Creed serves to provide Americans with the stan-
dards they need to solve common problems facing the community . How-
ever, the resolution of social problems will probably remain incomplete in-
asmuch as human nature is not perfectable .
The social studies curriculum proposed by Oliver and Shaver would
have students study various social issues and analyze them via the useful
perspective of the "American Creed" (p . 13) . This necessitates the stu-
dents' further exposure to the descriptive and conceptual levels of our cul-
ture and the subcultures which might impinge on it . But most importantly,
the students must "be committed to the basic ideals of American society
. . ." as expressed in the Creed (p . 14) .
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Oliver and Shaver are concerned about the problems associated with in-
doctrination but they contend that social cohesion is not possible without
common normative commitments (p . 14) . They seek to avoid the worst
problems of indoctrination by defining the American Creed on two levels .
The first, including the general tenets of the Creed, must be imposed on
students. However, the translation of the Creed to specific solutions or be-
haviors is left to individuals and groups (p . 14) . At this second level the
government must guarantee a pluralistic process of choice .
The behavior of the social studies educator whose views might conflict
with the American Creed are carefully circumscribed . The classroom is not
considered an appropriate place for those who seek to subvert the ideals of
the society because the students are not in an autonomous position from
which they can fight back (p . 14) . At the very least American social edu-
cators have an obligation to use our "culture as an operative basis for cur-
ricular decisions" (p. 26) .
Even though no values can be proven beyond any doubt, the authors
contend that we must avoid adopting the position of moral relativism (p .
51) . They assume that people will "intuitively" agree on what best consti-
tutes "civilized" behavior (p . 51). In this sense, they seem to concur with
the reconstructionist position that we must live by "tentative conclusion
about ultimate moral meaning" (p . 27) .
To facilitate the process of value analysis, Oliver and Shaver suggest
that social values, e.g ., equality and freedom, be viewed as dimensional con-
structs such as equal-unequal or freedom-coercion . This avoids the either-or
reasoning often employed in value decisions. Instead, the problem becomes
one of determining at what point on a continuum a behavior should be
given priority over others (p . 27) .
When Oliver and Shaver say that the dimensional perspective could
make it easier for students to deal with reality, they are speaking of the fa-
cilitation of compromises within the framework of a pluralistic political sys-
tem. For example, they cite separate-but-equal as superior to separate-but-
unequal, even though the former may not be an ideal ethical condition (p .
27) . The same kind of reasoning applies to the qualifications and limits
placed on basic freedoms like speech, press, etc . Thus, in conflict situations,
ethical conduct amounts to the "right" compromise among values (p . 28) .
The resolution of such compromises will turn on "what persuasion finally
triumphs within the group which asks the questions" (p . 51) . But the ulti-
mate value of human dignity may never be sacrificed for the sake of a deci-
sion (p. 51) .
Oliver and Shaver note that it may be impossible to reach a complete
consensus on any issue . Hence, a society must agree in advance on what
will constitute an adequate majority for decision making . Once such deci-
sions are resolved, dissenting members of society are bound by the decision
as long as it was accomplished by a process of rational consent (p . 62) .
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Thus there are really two basic values in a democratic society, human dig-
nity and rational consent .
When viewed from the radical reconstructionist perspective, this ratio-
nale has several positive attributes . It emphasizes the importance of study-
ing social issues and value conflicts . The authors are also concerned with
the problems of indoctrination and moral relativism . They urge social edu-
cators to make normative commitments to the higher values of the Ameri-
can Creed and the process of rational consent .
But other aspects of this rational conflict with the radical reconstruc-
tionist viewpoint. First, Oliver and Shaver do not emphasize social criticism
nor do they explicitly criticize the culture or its institutions . Also, the scope
of the ideas they examine does not include any consideration of radical pro-
posals for cultural or institutional change . In fact, they seem to believe that
social education is not the proper arena for dealing with radical criticism of
the culture .
In addition, their approach to indoctrination does not deal with the
defacto moral relativism which emerges when the higher values of the
Creed are too amorphous to apply in concrete situations . If the application
of the Creed in specific situations must be determined on the basis of a vote
or the relative power of interest groups, how can it serve effectively as a
guide for social decisions?
The view of the "good society" expressed in this rationale seems to be
one based on the core values of the American Creed, and the process of ra-
tional consent and political pluralism. These are highly desirable facets of a
liberal political culture . However, their effectiveness might be greatly di-
minished in a society which functions without a serious commitment to the
need for social criticism, nor do they propose a specific theory of social wel-
fare to serve as a guide for social criticism . Given these limitations, stu-
dents might be restricted to making hypothetical decisions within the
framework of the extant culture and institiutional arrangements . In short,
this rationale does not indicate much potential for critical examination of
our culture, institutions or the ideology which rationalizes them .
History' and the Social Science Disciplines
as a Rationale for Social Education
This rationale is probably the most popular and influential, although its
proponents often disagree among themselves. The dominant place of history
in social education is obvious and the other social science disciplines have
made significant gains in the last two decades . (See, for example, the No-
vember 1972 issue of Social Education wherein twenty-six projects were
analyzed and only four were not directly based on the social science
disciplines .)
'There has been considerable debate as to whether history is a social science (Shaver and
Berlak, 1968) . However, this issue is peripheral to the concerns of this paper and the terms
will be used interchangeably.
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Among the earliest advocates of this rationale are Wesley and Wron-
ski (1958) who conceived of the social studies as the social sciences "sim-
plified for pedagogical purposes" (p . 3). But it was Jerome Bruner (1960)
who gave this rationale increased credibility . Bruner's basic approach was
to make the structure of the social science disciplines (i .e ., the concepts,
generalizations, theories, and methods of investigation and organization)
the focus of social education . He believed that these structures could be
taught in some intellectually respectable form to students of all ages (p .
14) .
Teaching the structure of the disciplines was central to Bruner because
he believed that "grasping the structure of a subject is understanding it in a
way that permits many other things to be related to it meaningfully" (p .
7) . In addition he perceived the structure of the disciplines as the best
means for resolving social problems .
William T. Lowe (1969) was strongly influenced by Bruner, and he
makes the following claims regarding the value of the social science ra-
tional. First, we will learn more if what we learn is logically organized, and
the disciplines provided such organization . Second, this approach to learn-
ing also increases retention, and knowledge learned in this way is more eas-
ily transferred to new situations (pp . 40-41) . Lowe also maintains that the
structure of the disciplines gives the social education curriculum a theoreti-
cal focus and sets intellectual priorities for teaching . As he puts it, "The
basic purpose of the school should be the intellectual development of its cit-
izens . . ." (p. 51) .
The writers who support the social science rationale fall into two major
groups . One seeks to integrate, synthesize or orchestrate the disciplines
(among others, Lowe, 1969 ; Senesh, 1971 ; and Kuhn, 1971) . Members of a
second group tend to focus on their particular discipline as the most impor-
tant basis for social education . (For examples of this view see Wiggens
(1972 ), Morrissett (1967 ), Morrissett and Stevens (1971), Krug (1967 )
and Bestor (1969).)
The historian Bestor is an excellent illustration of the latter perspective .
Bestor (1969) argues that students must learn to function in an uncertain
future. "They must accordingly understand the inescapable fact of social
change, which only history can really teach" (p . 183). Bestor accepts the
view that the purpose of the social studies is "civic training" but he sees
this as practically synonymous with training in history . The end result
should be "the raising up of a loyal, well informed, thoughtful citizenry
" (p. 183). In addition, only history teaches the "humaness" of people
and makes them aware of their own separate individualities by giving them
knowledge of their past (p . 183) .
History provides other benefits as well . It "is the study of history, not
contemporary issues, that provides genuine `problem solving' situations" (p .
184) . History provides a series of problems for which the results are in and
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an answer sheet is supplied to check "the accuracy and adequacy of . . .
analysis and judgments" (p . 184). Thus history gives the "long view" in
dealing with contemporary issues.
Perhaps the strongest proponent of the social science rationale is
Charles E . Keller (1968) . His argument, similar to Lowe's, goes even fur-
ther. Keller would exclude all efforts by social studies educators to train
students in citizenship (p . 189) . We do not, in his estimation, really know
what "good citizenship" means . Therefore, we should stop trying to teach
attitudes and behaviors that lead to the "good" citizen .
The social studies are not a discipline but a federation of subjects each
with its own discipline . . . no discipline-or federation of subjects-
should ever "impose a pattern of behavior" on anybody . (p. 189)
By focusing on the basic ideas, concepts and generalizations of the disci-
plines and by promoting inductive thinking, we will teach students how to
think. It should be left to them to form their own conclusions .
A rationale based on the social science disciplines reflects a number of
the radical reconstructionist concerns . The disciplines provide a rich source
of data, and a wide, even radical, range of viewpoints . Also, this rationale's
commitment to objectivity and rigorous methods for seeking the truth are
potentially formidable barriers to the distortion and suppression of
information .
However, given the radical reconstructionist's critieria, the disciplines
do not provide a sufficient rationale for social education . The disciplines are
often used to study education, but they are not centrally concerned with so-
cial education and its problems. Social scientists do make commitments to
certain syntactical or methodological processes for seeking truth, but they
do not share a common interest regarding which problems should be inves-
tigated, nor how their findings should be incorporated into social education .
This rationale also fails to provide a general theory of social welfare or vi-
sion of the "good society ." In short, this rationale presents social educators
with a bewildering array of data and alternative interpretations without any
clear orientation as to the "best" way to proceed when selecting content
and teaching methods .
One might argue that the structure of the disciplines is the key for con-
tent selection . But to what will the structure be applied? Which problems
deserve priority and what future direction should our society take? Ironi-
cally, Bruner has significantly revised his earlier views and now feels that
studying the structure of the disciplines is too remote and that the structure
of knowledge could be better learned by studying social problems (Bruner,
1971, p . 20) .
This rationale also fails to deal adequately with the issue of indoctrina-
tion . The disciplines are preoccupied with value neutrality, i .e., the study of
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what is as opposed to what ought to be . The tacit assumption seems to be
that the process of objective social science inquiry is a sufficient safeguard
against indoctrination, because only a structure and methodology are im-
posed on students . But this view fails to note that there must be some val-
ues criteria for the selection of content and methods . Bruner has come to
realize this, and he now contends that the process of education is not neu-
tral because the way it is conducted can guarantee a future for some while
dealing others out (Bruner, 1971, p . 21) .
Finally, the social science rationale does not emphasize the need for so-
cial criticism as a central element of social education . One could argue that
this rationale-lacking a theory of social welfare, a vision of the "good soci-
ety", a means to deal adequately with indoctrination or a commitment to
social criticism-will tend to rationalize and transmit the status quo .
Inquiry as a Rationale for
Social Education
A number of social educators emphasize the importance of developing
inquiry skills ; however, the emphasis placed on the process varies widely . At
times it is described as a discrete skill which could be applied to a variety of
rationales (Beyer, 1971 ) . Others seems to view the process of inquiry as
something more, i .e ., a rationale in and of itself, which is supportive of
other values (Goldmark, 1965, 1968 ; Engle, 1970; Engle & Longstreet,
1972) . As Bernice Goldmark (1965) states, "The teacher is demonstrating
basic democratic values by the very choice of the method of inquiry" (p .
351) . And, she notes, this rationale is always open and committed to public
scrutiny including inquiry into the inquiry process itself .
Goldmark (1968) and Brubaker (1967) are among the few contempo-
rary social educators who acknowledge some of the contributions of Counts
and Brameld. They accept the need for some imposition in education, but,
according to Brubaker, the best solution is to indoctrinate "students to ac-
cept the doctrine that inquiry into all matters is absolutely desirable" (p .
120) .
Goldmark (1968) is critical of Counts and Brameld for overemphasiz-
ing the ends of society above the means for achieving those ends (p . 41) .
Goldmark proposes the inquiry process as a sufficient rationale for the so-
cial studies, and believes it reinforces a central aim of education which is to
develop responsible, scientific methods of judgment, including the analysis
of values (p. 2). The process of inquiry "should lead to a reconstruction of
values to meet the demands of a rapidly changing world" '(p .2) . Goldmark
sees inquiry as more than a mere cognitive operational process . It also oper-
ates in the affective realm because "It is basically a quality of commitment
to a way of behavior-to doubting and questioning" (p . 7) . These behav-
iors become the goals of a social studies program based upon inquiry .
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Goldmark maintains that thus far the definitions of social "problems"
have proven too vague to serve as the core of social education . In her view,
we probably cannot predict with any certainty the knowledge students will
need for the future, but we can assume that they "will probably always
need a method for making judgments about problems-for evaluating al-
ternatives and making decisions" (p . 43) . In addition, students should be
educated "to want to cope with problems" (p . 43) . Subject matter should
always be viewed as a means to resolve problems but "never as an end in it-
self" (p. 90) .
The inquiry rationale reflects the radical reconstructionists' concern for
the need to emphasize a doubting, critical attitude when investigating social
issues. Attention is also given to the importance of being able to investigate
all issues and that no ideas or systems are sacrosanct .
However, this rationale ignores most of the other concerns of radical re-
constructionism . First, it provides no clear social orientation or vision of the
"good society" to guide the selection of content. There is a commitment to
inquiry as a teaching method, but there are no guidelines to determine
which problems should be investigated or what would constitute desirable
decision-making outcomes .
The way this rationale deals with the issue of indoctrination also creates
problems. The need to impose the inquiry process is acknowledged, but the
imposition of substantive values is rejected . The implication is that all ques-
tions are open and no problem can be solved in any final sense . On one level
this is true, but it is a distorted and imbalanced view because no effort is
made to indicate how one might judge the relative value of decisions . It also
fails to recognize the radical reconstructionists' claim that social educators
do in fact make commitments, . albeit tentative ones, to values and
programs .
Finally, this rationale makes no apparent attempt to examine critically
our cultural institutions . Although the rationale does support critical in-
quiry and investigation of social issues, it does not emphasize the impor-
tance of social criticism as a central part of social education . Instead, the
focus is on a process for investigation and not on the need to expose outmo-
ded ideologies and the dysfunctional aspects of the culture .
Social Education as Inquiry into
Selected Social Problems
Several social educators have favored this rationale (Johnson, 1956 ;
Hunt & Metcalf, 1968; Massialas & Cox, 1966 ; Nelson, 1974; and Phil-
lips, 1974, among others) . The Hunt and Metcalf rationale is perhaps the
best example of this genre and will serve as the focus of study . They define
education as the transmission of that part of our culture which has ongoing
value to the next generation (p . 23). Problems develop because people disa-
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gree over which parts of the culture are of most value . In the main, the
choice is based on the kind of society one desires in the future (p. 23) . Like
the reconstructionists, Hunt and Metcalf believe that our culture is conflict-
ridden . Problems seem to multiply faster than our ability to resolve them .
The most important problems are related to "closed areas" of our culture
which are generally avoided or excluded from critical examination (pp. 26-
27). They include the following as examples : power and law; religion and
morality ; race and minority-group relations ; social class ; sex, courtship and
marriage; nationalism, and economics (p . 27) . The authors note that "Any
belief that has not been subject to rational examination is by definition a
prejudice no matter how correct or incorrect it may be" (p . 27) . They rec-
ommend a social education program designed to use reflective inquiry to
study the problematic areas of our culture, especially the closed areas (p .
24)
The closed areas are especially important because they remain as poten-
tial "sources of totalitarian belief and practice in a culture that strains in
two directions, democratic and authoritarian" (p. 28) . By generally exclud-
ing closed areas from investigation, the schools tend to concentrate on
trivia. This problem is compounded by an over-emphasis on new techniques
to motivate students (p . 28) . The result is the consumption of student and
teacher energy on irrelevant content and technique .
Hunt and Metcalf are also concerned with the transmission of core val-
ues as part of their rationale . Peripheral values may fluctuate but citizens
in a democracy are in danger if they cannot agree on the interpretation of
such core values as individual dignity, freedom, and equality (p . 34). But if
value consensus is not possible, a democratic society might yet be preserved
if the method of reflective inquiry is widely accepted to resolve issues of
truth and meaning (p . 34) .
Like the reconstructionists, Hunt and Metcalf also believe that "Ameri-
can society is in turmoil, transition and crisis" (p . 42). The outcome is not
inevitable and could be democratic or authoritarian . Social educators "can
help to tip the scales in one direction or another . . ." (p. 42) . Thus, social
educators have a choice and can use the process of reflective inquiry to help
students correct their habitual and distorted ways of thinking (pp . 45-46) .
Hunt and Metcalf warn against confusing true problem solving with
pseudo-problem solving, which they explain as organizing curriculum
around problems as defined by textbook authors, teachers, curriculum ex-
perts, etc . (p . 78) . This is in sharp contrast to authentic problems, which
result "when students sense inadequacies or incompatibilities in their be-
liefs, concepts, or values" (p . 79) . At first glance this approach seems quite
child centered, something to which the reconstructionists had strongly ob-
jected. Yet Hunt and Metcalf have suggested numerous examples of what
they obviously consider authentic problems . The apparent contradiction
might be resolved by viewing their warning about pseudo-problems as a
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methodological caveat, i .e., teachers may-select problems for students to
consider but it is pointless to proceed if the teacher is unable to develop the
students' awareness that a real problem does exist. They evidently think
this is possible because they offer numerous techniques for developing stu-
dent awareness of problems . In fact, they contend that the content of edu-
cation may logically be imposed . This is so, because individuals often do not
see the connection between their personal problems and the "broader social
maladjustments in which they are rooted" (p . 287) .
The authors believe that need, in a cultural context, is a value term . In
this sense a culture "(1) values the absence of certain frustrations, and (2)
cherishes certain means for reducing frustration" (p . 287) . Thus, because
needs are cultural in origin and social in meaning, imposition cannot be
avoided in education . A major problem is that our present system of educa-
tion imposes conflicting values leaving students in a state of confusion (p .
287) .
Because the individual is so familiar with his/her culture he/she tends
to take it for granted . In such a state of mind he/she often tends to assume
it is right, logical and natural (p . 287) . Hence, the severe conflicts present
in the culture frequently remain hidden or closed . At best they might be
perceived as aberrations in an otherwise sound social system . Reflective in-
quiry can help a student pierce this illusory state, but Hunt and Metcalf
warn that doing so may either "fortify or undermine" basic social beliefs
(p. 289) .
Reflective inquiry is compatible with the scientific method but it also
includes other criteria for arriving at the truth . These include logic and
philosophic discourse (p . 67) . The basic criterion for accepting the truth of
a hypothesis is evidence. Even if the evidence is only slightly better it will
justify the preference for one belief over another (p . 76) . But all conclu-
sions must be viewed as tentative, i .e ., "All knowledge is assumed to be rel-
ative, in the sense that no question is closed to reexamination provided that
a reason to reexamine develops" (p . 76) . However, this does not preclude
establishing principles or positions whose validity we may accept
indefinitely .
Of the five rationales examined in this paper, Hunt and Metcalf's ap-
pears best to reflect the views of radical reconstructionism . They believe
that we suffer a culture-crisis because we have failed to reach a national
consensus on dominant social values . They also oppose the uncritical trans-
mission of our culture and urge social educators to give special attention to
the issues normally "closed" to investigation . Hunt and Metcalf are sensi-
tive to the problems associated with indoctrination, and believe that we can
use reflective inquiry to find defensible principles to which we can make in-
definite commitments . Finally, they agree that social educators should be
involved in the process of improving our culture .
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Still, when viewed in terms of the radical reconstructionist criteria, the
Hunt-Metcalf rationale has several faults . For one thing, their vision of the
"good society" is difficult to determine . They are obviously not satisfied
with the status quo, but they do not suggest clear guidelines for a preferred
future. And though they are committed to the process of reflective inquiry
and the need to reach a consensus on cultural values, they do not specify a
theory of social welfare to guide and orient the selection of such values .
Thus they offer no clear standards for social criticism or cultural change .
In addition, although the rationale emphasizes the investigation of
closed cultural areas, the actual focus is to study these areas from a van-
tage point well within our extant culture and institutional arrangements.
Thus, when Hunt and Metcalf examine issues such as racism, unemploy-
ment, etc., the focus seems to be on how to adjust our present institutions to
help ameliorate these problems . There is little or no analysis of the possibi-
lity that the very structure of our economic, social and political institutions
might be the root cause of such problems. This omission tends to blunt the
impact and scope of this rationale's commitment to social criticism .
Citizen Action as a Rationale
for Social Studies Education
Fred Newmann (1975) is the leading proponent of citizen action as a
rationale for social education . One reason he believes this approach is im-
portant is that most citizens feel they lack significant control over their
destinies and everyday lives . Newmann suggests three possible reasons for
this pervasive sense of alienation and powerlessness .
First, one could subscribe to some form of power elite theory in which
the majority of people are exploited to maintain the position of powerful
groups (p . 1) . Another possible explanation is rooted in factors which re-
sult in the oppression of certain groups . This includes all forms of discrimi-
nation, e.g ., racism, sexism, and attitudes prejudicial toward youth, the
mentally ill, physically handicapped, poor, elderly, homosexuals, ex-con-
victs, etc . The third explanation for powerlessness holds that social issues
"are inherently so complex that man will never solve them through deliber-
ate rational intervention" (p. 2). Indeed, so many variables seem to be in-
volved that attempts to change the system at best result in the temporary il-
lusion of control. We must, therefore, accept that our lack of control is
basic to our existence (p . 2) .
Newmann accepts each of these interpretations as partly true but he in-
sists that none is sufficient to account for the widespread inability of people
to affect public policy (p . 2) . Therefore, it makes sense to focus on improv-
ing citizen competence as a necessary requirement for exerting one's influ-
ence in public affairs. Furthermore, if lack of citizen competence could be
eliminated as a variable, the other alleged impediments to action could be
better tested for actual effect .
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Newmann distinguishes between his approach and most other citizen-
ship programs in social studies education. The others tend to emphasize
"thinking critically about" or "taking an active interest in" citizenship,
while Newmann's emphasis is on exerting influence. In his view the current
emphasis on developing knowledge of the disciplines, the political legal
structure, decision making, analysis of social problems, and voting are all
inadequate to develop the skills necessary to exert influence (pp . 4-5) .
For instance, our schools tend to teach students to support such values
as democracy, majority rule, equality, due process of law and so forth . The
development of these attitudes is presumed to be the basis of a vigilant and
active citizenry. Yet, though these concepts are relevant to the issue of citi-
zen influence, they also tend "to communicate unworkable notions of citi-
zen participation" (p . 6). The net effect is to emphasize the students' .need
to understand rather than to exert influence . Also, too much emphasis has
been placed on reflection at an abstract and general level, and Newmann
recommends more analysis at specific and concrete levels . We should tend
to focus on local rather than national issues, as these have a far greater
probability of solution (p . 6) .
The key, in Newmann's view, is not mere action but action to exert in-
fluence. Thus, much out of school student activity, such as trips to nursing
homes and police stations or simulated career experiences, would not meet
Newmann's criteria . He uses the term "environmental competence" to de-
scribe his educational goal . He defines competence as "the ability to behave
in such a way, or to use one's effort in such a manner, as to produce the
consequences that one intends" (p. 12) .
Newmann also believes that by developing the student's environmental
competence we can help strengthen the consent ideal, a primary goal of
public education (p. 46) . Without the ability of all persons to participate in
the political process some groups will be better able to subject others to
their will (p.47) . Newmann notes that, at present, various forces (including
powerful elites and the complexity of issues) often make action difficult or
impossible (p. 54). However, he believes consent should not be seen as an
end which will ultimately be achieved by all, but rather as an ideal goal we
continue to strive toward . Indeed, to do less might result in the infliction of
a self fulfilling prophecy (p . 54) .
Regarding the political role of schools, they ought to be as neutral as
possible. Truth cannot be determined unless we are able to examine a wide
range of alternatives . Thus school should be committed to a pluralistic
model which exposes students to a great "variety of political philosophies
and cultural styles" (p . 64) . However, the school must not be neutral in its
commitment to the consent ideal .
Yet it is never correct, in Newmann's view, to try to convince students
to endorse specific policies educators believe would strengthen the consent
system (p . 72) . This is an educationally indefensible policy, because it is
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seldom clear which policies would best achieve our ends . It also denies stu-
dents the opportunity to inquire openly into the issues and policies they
might wish to support . At most, educators should teach the skills required
to make policy decisions (p. 72) . This does not violate the principle of
school neutrality or the consent ideal. In other words, Newmann supports
the development of the consent ideal and not specific social or political
goals, e .g ., the eradication of poverty (p . 166) .
Newmann's rationale is well developed and his argument supporting cit-
izen action is quite persuasive . Indeed, he makes a stronger case for citizen
action than one finds in radical reconstructionism . This rationale also rec-
ognizes the need to impose certain values on students, e .g ., higher demo-
cratic values and the rational consent ideal .
However, from the radical reconstructionist perspective, his rationale
has a number of flaws . The rationale's vision of the "good society" is vague .
Certain standards are evident, e.g., active, environmentally competent citi-
zens, a commitment to the consent ideal, and a pluralistic political system .
But the rationale is not based on any theory of social welfare, and New-
mann makes it clear that social educators should not attempt to impose a
preference for specific social policies or outcomes . Thus the rationale lacks
a clear social orientation .
Newmann's rationale also fails to deal adequately with the problem of
indoctrination . Although he makes a case for imposing higher democratic
values and the consent ideal, he does not suggest standards for determining
which content is most important or how best to resolve specific conflicts
among individuals or groups . Given these limitations, his proposals for in-
creasing citizen competence are subject to potential abuse. Even Newmann
admits that the groups which hold advantageous positions in our society
might be the ones who benefit most from developing their environmental
competence .
Finally, this rationale does not emphasize the importance of social criti-
cism or the need to consider radical proposals for social change . The ratio-
nale's focus is primarily procedural, not substantive . With no guiding social
orientation, the tacit assumption seems to be that our present culture and
institutions are functional . The only serious problem posed by Newmann is
the masses' apparent inability to exert political influence . But if everyone
were suddenly given such competence, each would still lack a value consen-
sus about how to use it . Rational consent may provide a process for reach-
ing consensus, but, in some respects, increased competence could be anti-
thetical to compromise . Instead, groups with increased competence might
only strive harder to impose their will . Our recent experience with single-
issue interest groups gives some indication of this .
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Conclusion
The rationales examined in this paper are among the best in modern so-
cial education . Even when viewed from the critical perspective of radical re-
constructionism, they provide a rich and varied source of iedas . The general
commitment to reflective inquiry and the freedom to investigate all areas of
the culture are reassuring . In addition, Newmann's proposals for developing
environmental competence are a welcome addition to the field .
Several authors express a sensitivity to the problems associated with in-
doctrination and offer some suggestions for dealing with them . Most would
limit indoctrination to the imposition of the method of reflective inquiry,
but others accept the need to impose normative standards, albeit on a very
general level . Hunt and Metcalf agree with the radical reconstructionist
view that our nation suffers from a serious value crisis . While they do not
fully accept the reconstructionists' views regarding the nature of the crisis
or the best means to resolve it, they do agree that social educators can and
should play an important role in the process of cultural and social change .
Still, given the criteria of radical reconstructionism, all the modern ra-
tionales have serious limitations . First, none gives sufficient attention to
radical ideas or proposals for social change . To some extent this is under-
standable, for social educators are creatures of the culture and tend to re-
flect its dominant values . This tendency is reinforced by various special in-
terest groups which pressure social educators to maintain traditional values .
The net effect seems to be a considerable amount of self censorship .
Ironically, the liberal or progressive tradition in social education might
also function to block the examination of radical ideas . Progressive social
educators seem to share a general commitment to the values of the "Ameri-
can Creed," political pluralism and rational consent . The idea that all
groups should be able to speak out and participate in the political process
seems to allow for the examination of radical viewpoints . But in practice,
this might not be the case. Political pluralism depends on certain rules and
a willingness to compromise in order to function effectively . These are nec-
essary and desirable conditions for the operation of a democratic society .
However, when applied to the process of social education, the ideology of
political pluralism is often hostile to radical ideas. Radical proposals are
often posed in such a way as to reject attempts at compromise or to reject
the values of liberal democracy . There is an apparent reluctance, therefore,
to consider ideas which are perceived as incompatible with or a threat to
the pluralist ideology. But the failure to give adequate attention to radical
ideas limits the scope of social education and deprives students of the op-
portunity to examine a wide range of cultural alternatives .
A second limitation is the failure of the modern rationales to reflect a
concern for the importance of social criticism as a component of social edu-
cation. The Hunt-Metcalf rationale is a partial exception, because it urges
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investigation of the closed areas of society and rejects the uncritical trans-
mission of the culture . But their rationale offers no guidelines or standards
for social criticism .
The extent to which our culture and institutions require change is diffi-
cult to assess without an ongoing process of social criticism . Furthermore,
one might conclude that if students are not taught that social criticism is
important, they are likely to assume that there is no need to examine criti-
cally the culture they are learning via social education . To the extent that
this happens, social education will fail to play a role in the process of inves-
tigating cultural lag and the possible need for change . Another possible
consequence is that the unexamined extant culture will become the stu-
dents' model for a preferred future .
Ironically, even the emphasis on inquiry, evident in most of the modern
rationales, is presented in such a way as to reinforce the view that social
criticism is not an important part of social education . The various inquiry
approaches are generally applied to situations wherein one must determine
which adjustments need to be made in the most relevant institution(s) to
resolve a social problem . The implicit assumption seems to be that such ad-
justments are all that are required to resolve social problems, inasmuch as
our basic institutions are adequate to meet our social and cultural needs .
There is apparently no serious consideration of the possibility that some of
our present institutional arrangements may be the root cause of social
problems and therefore require radical change . One might reject this view
after careful analysis, but how can we be confident that such questions are
not important enough to investigate?
A third problem is that these modern rationales generally lack any the-
ory of social welfare or a specific view of the "good society ." Several au-
thors note the importance of establishing a consensus on significant social
values, but none are willing to specify how these values ought to be applied
in concrete situations . The resolution of these issues is generally left to the
process of rational consent within a system of political pluralism. This is a
useful practice but it tends to limit the concept of consensus to the results
of a voting procedure. In addition, if people are asked to do this without the
benefit of the insights gained via social criticism and the examination of
radical proposals for change, how significant and meaningful can their deci-
sions be? Finally, without a theory of social welfare or a vision of the "good
society," social education lacks a general orientation, save perhaps the reifi-
cation of the status quo .
While it is true that social educators are given the task of transmitting
our culture to the young, it does not follow that this process must proceed
without social criticism, the consideration of radical alternatives or a vision
of the "good society ." If social education does not function to examine criti-
cally our culture and institutions, who will perform this task? What are the
possible consequences of omitting these concerns from our social education
programs?
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These are difficult questions and they have no easy answers . Still, they
are relevant to the concerns of social educators and they require further
study and debate . The radical reconstructionists have tried to dramatize the
significance of these issues and to suggest some guidelines along which a
debate might proceed . It is hoped that modern social educators will give
more attention to such questions and the implications they have for revising
current rationales.
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